DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES UNITED STATES FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION CENTER FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION AND RESEARCH
This transcript has not been edited or corrected, but appears as received from the commercial transcribing service. Accordingly the Food and Drug Administration makes no representation as to its accuracy.
TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES ADVISORY COMMITTEE
21st Meeting Friday, June 12, 2009 8:00 a.m. Holiday Inn
DR. ROHWER: We first detected infectivity at that point, but that was part of several measurements over the incubation period and you could extrapolate that curve and it extrapolated to zero back around 30 percent of the incubation time.
DR. HOGAN: Dr. Manuelidis?
DR. MANUELIDIS: Yes, I think there are a couple of things that concern me. One is that using one model of animals may not always be the most effective one. In 1978 we wrote an article in Science showing that infectivity was present basically from about half way in the disease and went through the end and at the end it became highly infectious, much more infectious in the guinea pig for instance than in Bob’s models. I would also like to point out that, for instance, vCJD is BSE and basically in a cow blood is not infectious and in primates it is. So, one must be very careful about this. The third thing which is a concern of mine is that in the report here it says we are talking about vCJD and my
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concern is that we are limiting things to vCJD. It says because BSE has been detected in so few US cattleB-now, anybody who works with the USDA knows that the USDA has been impossible about letting anybody work with BSE and we actually had no surveillance. So, we have no idea about how many US cattle are really infected as compared to places like Japan that look at every single cow. The fourth thing is that there are recent reports that have been going back for several years and have now become more important of variants of BSE which are not vCJD, some of which people believe have more of a linkage to sporadic CJD. We also do not look for these things.
So, I think that in looking at what we say about what should be done, although this has no practical application right now to what the FDA is going to do about saying we can’t use this blood or that blood, I think it is a much broader problem. I also agree with people in the audience who came and said that CJD is not a reportable disease in many places, and I think this is very frustrating in terms of knowing what is really going on in our population. So, I would like to add that.
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DR. HOGAN: I think those are most important points that a lot of us agree with, and I know that the staff is looking at some of those in the future. What we are specifically charged with today is a little bit less encompassing issue but, nonetheless, exactly what you say should be considered.
SNIP...
MR. TEMPLIN: I just want to make two comments. I am sort of troubled that we don’t know how much is actually infectious. A comment too about what Dr. Manuelidis said about cattle. If a farmer has cattle that he thinks may e
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infectious he is going to throw it out in the back 40 and cover it up or throw it on the compost pile and never report it to the government because he is going to lose everything he or she owns.
DR. HOGAN: I think we are going to have some speakers this afternoon that are going to address the current USDA situation. So, we will have questions for them at that point. Miss Hamilton?
MS. HAMILTON: I have a comment about what Dr. Manuelidis said to a question. It troubles me because a few years ago there was a lot of hype about the downed cattle that were getting through and being used in food for animals and what-not, and now we don’t hear anything else about it, and she was saying that there is no surveillance in that area at all. My big question is why.
DR. HOGAN: Well, we will ask the USDA this afternoon, but I am not sure that zero is correct. I think it has been lowered significantly from its initial stages but it is not zero. Dr. Kreindel?
DR. KREINDEL: We are going to have a presentation on the USDA surveillance, but we do have surveillance and our surveillance is according to international standards.
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You know, it is not surveillance that really protects the US population. You know, we do have surveillance and there was a lot of surveillance going on. We called that surveillance enhanced surveillance. We are going to have information about that. We still have surveillance going on, you know, at the level requested by international standards but we do cover a lot of mitigations about sequential interlocking that really prevent, you know, if any BSE is present to be recycled.
DR. HOGAN: Thank you. Perhaps we will defer the discussion of surveillance till this afternoon. Do any of the statistics experts on the panel have anything to say relative to the mathematical accuracy of this model, since all those equations make me dizzy?
SNIP...then the BSe picks up on page 205 with the mathmatical formula's and the junk science of the OIE, but then on page 216 please see the questions on BSE testing in the USA by Dr. Manuelidis ;
DR. MANUELIDIS: I am just curious if you can explain to me the difference between the testing that is going on now in Europe with all the other variants or other strains of BSE, the test that is used, and whether the USDA still refuses to sort of use tests that other countries use, and what might our tests have that may be different and are they still restricted, or what is the rationale for that?
DR. HUGHES: Well, the USDA uses tests that have been validated.
DR. MANUELIDIS: I believe that the tests have been validated for the European and the Japanese stuff, they all use a standard test. So, I am curious about why the USDAB-there was the import I think you were referring to where the Japanese stopped importing food because, as I understood it and this is, of course, from places like The New York Times that may be totally wrong but as I understood it, the USDAB-this must have been about three or four years ago, said that they refused to use the test even though the plant was willing to use it. They said they had their own tests and they said they would only use their own tests.
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Maybe you can clarify that for me and tell me what the difference is between the tests, and whether you think that you can pick up the variants of BSE, not just the UK version of BSE. If there is really a difference in the sensitivity of the tests, if any independent side-by-side comparison has been done.
DR. KREINDEL: I am not sure I can answer your question but I think you are referring to the fact that they wanted to test all animals, rather than following the USDA requirements for testing.
DR. HUGHES: The question was why don’t we test all animals.
DR. MANUELIDIS: There is a test that is used in Europe and in Japan. It is used all over I think. It is a bioride[?] test and what the plant was willing to do, I understood from The New York Times, was to test their animals according to that protocol. The USDA said no, even though everybody else uses it, we want to use our own test. Then they never really did those tests. So, what I am really getting at is are our tests in the USDA as sensitive and as comprehensive even if we don’t test every animal--
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DR. HUGHES: Yes.
DR. MANUELIDIS: -Bfor all the variants of BSE and on what basis? Have you ever picked up any cases of BSE-H or BSE-L? Would you have an independent control that shows you that you can pick up these things with the tests as currently employed? Have there been any blind controls where an animal has a little bit of this or that just to see if you can pick it up out of a group?
DR. HUGHES: I think what you might be referring to is the Creekstone case.
DR. MANUELIDIS: Yes.
DR. HUGHES: Okay. Of course, I can’t comment on current litigation but, basically, the USDA is unwilling to, you know, have a test be validated as a food safety test. Again, this gets back to what I spoke about earlier, that the BSE test really isn’t a food safety test. It is possible to test an animal for BSE and have it be negative and still have the animal be positive for BSE. So, using that to put on a package label is just very confusing and kind of disingenuous to the public because it gives them a false sense of security about it. Our main focus for protecting human health is on other
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mitigation measures, such as the feed ban the FDA has in place; removal of specified risk materials. So, the tissues that we know are likely to contain agent never make it into the food chain in the first place. So, that is the basis of the refusal to allow that private company to do their own testing.
DR. MANUELIDIS: I don’t want to be difficult because BSE is not my specialty, minus the vCJD version of it, but as I understand, some of the BSE cases, like the typical UK BSE case, have been found in muscle where muscle has been found to be infectious. So, the food ban wouldn’t really deal with those. That is why I was asking what is the test. If you did a side-by-side comparison with blind controls would you be able to pick up what Europeans and Japanese pick up? That is really what I am asking.
DR. HUGHES: And I am afraid I can’t answer that, and I am not sureB-you know, the experts on that would be the folks at NVSL that are responsible for validating the test and choosing which test we use. But evidently they are not convinced that the other tests are better than what we use currently. But, again, I am sorry, I am not the expert
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in that particular category.
snip...
SEE FULL TEXT 346 PAGES ;
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/BloodVaccinesandOtherBiologics/TransmissibleSpongiformEncephalopathiesAdvisoryCommittee/UCM171810.pdf
Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Committee On June 12, 2009 (Singeltary submission)
http://tseac.blogspot.com/2009/05/meeting-of-transmissible-spongiform.html
Monday, June 01, 2009 Biochemical typing of pathological prion protein in aging cattle with BSE
SOMETHING TO PONDER ???
O.K. confusious asks, IF all these new atypical BSEs i.e. new strains of mad cow disease is just an 'OLD COW PRION DISEASE', why then can not the 'old human prion disease' such as the sporadic CJD, be from an 'old cow prion disease', same as the nvCJD 'young people mad cow disease' (which also happens in 74 year old), but why cannot the 'old cow prion diseases', i.e. l-BSE, h-BSE, and ibncBSE, cause the 'old people prion disease', which looks like sporadic CJD. seems that is what some of the pathology is showing ???
OH, that probably makes too much sense, and that the only answer could be that it's all just a happenstance of bad luck and or a spontaneous event, that just happens out of the clear blue sky $$$
IF this is the case, then where are all the SPONTANEOUS BSE CASES OF MAD COW DISEASE IN THE U.S.A., AND WHERE HAVE THEY BEEN BURIED IN THE USA OVER THE LAST 25 YEARS ???
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/06/biochemical-typing-of-pathological.html
Thursday, April 9, 2009
Docket No. FDA2002N0031 (formerly Docket No. 2002N0273) RIN 0910AF46 Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed; Final Rule: Proposed
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/04/docket-no-fda2002n0031-formerly-docket.html
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/r-calf-and-usa-mad-cow-problem-dont.html#comments
Sunday, April 12, 2009 r-calf and the USA mad cow problem, don't look, don't find, and then blame Canada
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/r-calf-and-usa-mad-cow-problem-dont.html
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/cjd-foundation-sides-with-r-calfers-no.html#comments
Tuesday, July 14, 2009
U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary and BSE Red Book Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST
WHERE did we go wrong $$$
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/us-emergency-bovine-spongiform.html
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html
NEW URL
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm
Thursday, March 19, 2009
MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA WITH ONGOING 12 YEARS OF DENIAL NOW, WHY IN THE WORLD DO WE TO TALK ABOUT THIS ANYMORE $$$
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html
Sunday, May 10, 2009
Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Committee On June 12, 2009 (Singeltary submission)
http://tseac.blogspot.com/2009/05/meeting-of-transmissible-spongiform.html
Wednesday, July 1, 2009
Nor98 scrapie identified in the United States J Vet Diagn Invest 21:454-463 (2009)
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/07/nor98-scrapie-identified-in-united.html
Tuesday, July 14, 2009
U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary and BSE Red Book Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST
WHERE did we go wrong $$$
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/us-emergency-bovine-spongiform.html
Transgenic mice expressing porcine prion protein resistant to classical scrapie but susceptible to sheep bovine spongiform encephalopathy and atypical scrapie. Emerg Infect Dis. 2009 Aug; [Epub ahead of print]
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/07/transgenic-mice-expressing-porcine.html
Saturday, June 13, 2009
Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States 2003 revisited 2009
http://cjdusa.blogspot.com/2009/06/monitoring-occurrence-of-emerging-forms.html
i am no doctor, i have no phd's, and I am president and ceo of nothing. ...TSS
wasted days and waste nights...freddy fender
stupid is, as stupid does...forest gump
still sadly disgusted...
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518