Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Center Date Time Location
CBER October 28-29, 2010
October 28 from 8:30 a.m. to approximately 5 p.m. October 29 from 8:30 a.m. to approximately 12:30 p.m. Holiday Inn, 2 Montgomery Village Avenue, Gaithersburg, MD
Agenda
On October 28, 2010 the Committee will discuss: (1) FDA’s risk assessment for potential exposure to the variant Creutzfeldt - Jakob disease (vCJD) agent in U.S.-licensed plasma-derived Factor VIII and (2) labeling of blood and blood components and plasma-derived products, including plasma-derived albumin and products containing plasma-derived albumin, to address the possible risk of transmission of vCJD. On October 29, 2010, the Committee will hear informational presentations related to FDA’s geographic donor deferral policy to reduce the possible risk of transmission of CJD and vCJD by blood and blood products and human cells, tissue and cellular and tissue based products. The Committee will also hear updates on the following topics: The development of devices to remove transmissible spongiform encephalopathy agents from blood components and chronic wasting disease.
Meeting Materials
Materials for this meeting will be available on the 2010 Meeting Materials, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee page.
Public Participation Information
Interested persons may present data, information, or views, orally or in writing, on issues pending before the committee.
Written submissions may be made to the contact person on or before October 21, 2010 Oral presentations from the public will be scheduled between approximate 11 a.m. and 11:45 a.m. and between 3:30 p.m. and 4 p.m. on October 28 and between approximately 10:30 a.m. and 11 a.m. on October 29. Those desiring to make formal oral presentations should notify the contact person and submit a brief statement of the general nature of the evidence or arguments they wish to present, the names and addresses of proposed participants, and an indication of the approximate time requested to make their presentation on or before October 13, 2010. Time allotted for each presentation may be limited. If the number of registrants requesting to speak is greater than can be reasonably accommodated during the scheduled open public hearing session, FDA may conduct a lottery to determine the speakers for the scheduled open public hearing session. The contact person will notify interested persons regarding their request to speak by October 14 , 2010. Contact Information
Bryan Emery or Rosanna Harvey 1401 Rockville Pike, HFM-71, Rockville, MD 20852 301-827-0314 FAX: 301-827-0294 e-mail: bryan.emery@fda.hhs.gov ; rosanna.harvey@fda.hhs.gov FDA Advisory Committee Information Line 1-800-741-8138 (301-443-0572 in the Washington, DC, area) code 3014512391. Please call the Information Line for up-to-date information on this meeting. FDA intends to make background material available to the public no later than 2 business days before the meeting. If FDA is unable to post the background material on its Web site prior to the meeting, the background material will be made publicly available at the location of the advisory committee meeting, and the background material will be posted on FDA’s Web site after the meeting.
A notice in the Federal Register about last minute modifications that impact a previously announced advisory committee meeting cannot always be published quickly enough to provide timely notice. Therefore, you should always check the agency’s Web site and call the appropriate advisory committee hot line/phone line to learn about possible modifications before coming to the meeting.
Persons attending FDA’s advisory committee meetings are advised that the agency is not responsible for providing access to electrical outlets. FDA welcomes the attendance of the public at its advisory committee meetings and will make every effort to accommodate persons with physical disabilities or special needs. If you require special accommodations due to a disability, please contact Bryan Emery at least 7 days in advance of the meeting. FDA is committed to the orderly conduct of its advisory committee meetings. Please visit our Web site for procedures on public conduct during advisory committee meetings.
Notice of this meeting is given under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. app. 2). Official FR Notice
http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/Calendar/ucm225791.htm
October 28-29, 2010
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Meeting Draft Agenda
DRAFT AGENDA
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee 22nd Meeting, October 28-29, 2010
The Holiday Inn Gaithersburg 2 Montgomery Village Avenue Gaithersburg, MD 20879
Thursday, October 28, 2010
8:30a.m. Opening Remarks, Chair, TSEAC Statement of Conflicts of Interest, Announcements 8:40 a.m. Topic I: Review of FDA’s Risk Assessment for Potential Exposure to Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in U.S.-licensed Plasma-Derived Factor VIII
Introduction, Steven Anderson, Ph.D., OBE, FDA (30’) Presentation of FDA Risk Assessment, Hong Yang, Ph.D., OBE, FDA (40’) Summary and Questions for the Committee, Steven Anderson, Ph.D., OBE, FDA (20’)
10:30 a.m. Break 10:45 a.m. Open Public Hearing 11:30 a.m. Open Committee Discussion
Questions for the Committee
12:30 p.m. Lunch 1:45 p.m. Topic II: Labeling of Plasma-derived Products, including Plasma-derived Albumin and Products Containing Plasma-derived Albumin to Address the Possible Risk of Transmission of V ariant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
Introduction and Rationale for Proposed Labeling Change for Plasma Derivatives to Reflect Possible vCJD Risk Dorothy Scott, M.D., DH, OBRR, FDA (15’) TSE Clearance in Manufacturing of Plasma Derivatives, PPTA (25’) Summary and Questions for the Committee Dorothy Scott, M.D., DH, OBRR, FDA (20’)
2:45 p.m. Break 3:00 p.m. Open Public Hearing 3:30 p.m. Open Committee Discussion
Questions for the Committee
4:30 p.m. Adjournment
Friday, October 29, 2010
8:30 a.m. Opening Remarks, Chair, TSEAC
Statement of Conflicts of Interest, Announcements
8:40 a.m. Informational Presentations: FDA’s Geographic Donor Deferral Policy to Reduce the Possible Risk of Transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease and Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease by Blood and Blood Products and Human Cells, Tissues and Cellular and Tissue-based Products
Review of Current FDA Policies David Asher, M.D., DETTD, OBRR, FDA (30’) Elizabeth Lybarger, M.F.S., M.S. LT USPHS, DHT, OCTGT, FDA (15’) Variant CJD in the UK and Worldwide, Robert Will, M.D., UK CJD Surveillance Unit, Edinburgh (30’) BSE in the USA and Worldwide, Linda Detwiler, D.V.M., University of Mississippi (15’) USDA Updates Christopher Robinson, D.V.M., National Center for Import and Export, APHIS, USDA (15’) Troy Bigelow, D.V.M, National Center for Animal Health Programs, APHIS, USDA (15’) Questions to Speakers (10’)
11:00 a.m. Open Public Hearing 11:30 a.m. Break 11:45 a.m. Committee Updates
Recent Advances in Development of Devices to Remove TSE Agents from Blood Components. Steven J. Burton, Ph.D., Prometric BioSciences, Ltd. (15’) Sam Coker, Ph.D., Pall Medical Corporation (15’) Tomo Yokomizo, M.Sc., Asahi-Kasei Medical (15’) Questions to Speakers (10’)
12:30 p.m. Adjournment
http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/BloodVaccinesandOtherBiologics/TransmissibleSpongiformEncephalopathiesAdvisoryCommittee/ucm229984.htm
Module 2. Estimates of vCJD Prevalence in US Donors and US Plasma Pools
This module estimates the number of US plasma donors potentially infected with the agent that is responsible for vCJD, and this information was used to derive the number and percentage of plasma pools potentially including donations containing the vCJD agent. This module used results of a travel survey of US donors to determine numbers of US plasma donors expected to be at increased risk for vCJD, including those with history of:
Dietary exposure to BSE-contaminated beef during long-term travel or residence in UK, France and other European countries (since 1980);
US military service in European countries where beef was obtained from the UK, including US military personnel and associated civilian employees and dependents posted on or residing near military facilities in Europe during certain years; and
Transfusion with blood collected in Europe ("EuroBlood").
US plasma donors potentially at increased risk for vCJD were further characterized by:
Age,
Country of travel or residence,
Year of travel or residence,
Specific duration of travel or residence.
The model also included the factors of:
Plasma type (Source Plasma or recovered plasma),
Rate and frequency of plasma donation,
Number of donations per plasma pool, and
Effectiveness of donor deferral policies.
After accounting for the factors listed above, we used both UK prevalence estimates to predict the number of vCJD donations that might have entered into US plasma pools of various sizes under two separate prevalence scenarios.
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/BloodVaccinesandOtherBiologics/TransmissibleSpongiformEncephalopathiesAdvisoryCommittee/UCM230048.pdf
SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES
ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING
October 28, 2010
Gaithersburg, MD
Topic II: Proposed revisions to the labeling recommendations to reflect potential risk of vCJD in plasma derivatives
Issue: FDA seeks advice on the proposed revisions to labeling recommendations for plasma derivative package inserts, to reflect potential risk of vCJD
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/BloodVaccinesandOtherBiologics/TransmissibleSpongiformEncephalopathiesAdvisoryCommittee/UCM230049.pdf
TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES
ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING
28- 29 October 2010
Issue Summary
Informational Topic: FDA’s Geographic Donor Deferral Policy to Reduce the Possible Risk of Transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease and Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease by Blood and Blood Products and Human Cells, Tissues and Cellular and Tissue-based Products
Issue: FDA wishes to update the Committee on the current regulatory considerations relating to Relevant Communicable Disease Agents and Diseases (RCDADs), of which TSEs are a part, for human cell, tissue, and cellular and tissue-based products (HCT/Ps), and also would like to identify current criteria that would render an HCT/P donor ineligible as a result of TSE risk. There is no decisional issue for the committee at this time.
Regulatory Background:
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/BloodVaccinesandOtherBiologics/TransmissibleSpongiformEncephalopathiesAdvisoryCommittee/UCM230050.pdf
Tuesday, September 14, 2010
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee; Notice of Meeting October 28 and 29, 2010
(COMMENT SUBMISSION)
http://tseac.blogspot.com/2010/09/transmissible-spongiform_14.html
what about the other strains of BSE i.e. atypical BSE, and other TSE in other species here in North America, and human TSE and risk factor from blood there from ?
atypical BSE are more virulent than typical UK c-BSE, so why would we be ignoring these factors here in the USA $ i.e. the Gold Card, TRADE $
Saturday, June 19, 2010
U.S. DENIED UPGRADED BSE STATUS FROM OIE
http://www.oie.int/eng/session2010/PDF%20Press%20releases/PRESS78_EN.pdf
see full text and reasons why here ;
http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/06/us-denied-upgraded-bse-status-from-oie.html
PLEASE NOTE *
Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.
snip...
The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...
http://web.archive.org/web/20030516051623/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf
Atypical BSE in Cattle
BSE has been linked to the human disease variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (vCJD). The known exposure pathways for humans contracting vCJD are through the consumption of beef and beef products contaminated by the BSE agent and through blood transfusions. However, recent scientific evidence suggests that the BSE agent may play a role in the development of other forms of human prion diseases as well. These studies suggest that classical type of BSE may cause type 2 sporadic CJD and that H-type atypical BSE is connected with a familial form of CJD.
To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.
This study will contribute to a correct definition of specified risk material (SRM) in atypical BSE. The incumbent of this position will develop new and transfer existing, ultra-sensitive methods for the detection of atypical BSE in tissue of experimentally infected cattle.
Responsibilities include:
Driving research at the National and OIE BSE reference lab to ensure project milestones are met successfully. Contributing to the preparation of project progress reports. Directing technical staff working on the project. Communicating and discussing results, progress and future direction with project principle investigator(s). Communicating with collaborative project partners. Qualifications:
Successful completion of a PhD degree in an area focusing on or related to prion diseases. Extensive experience with molecular and/or morphologic techniques used in studying prion diseases and/or other protein misfolding disorders. Ability to think independently and contribute new ideas. Excellent written and oral communication skills. Ability to multitask, prioritize, and meet challenges in a timely manner. Proficiency with Microsoft Office, especially Word, PowerPoint and Excel. How to apply:
Please send your application and/or inquiry to: Dr. Stefanie Czub, DVM, Ph.D. Head, National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory Canadian Food Inspection Agency Lethbridge Laboratory P.O. Box 640, Township Road 9-1 Lethbridge, AB, T1J 3Z4 Canada
phone: +1-403-382-5500 +1-403-382-5500 ext. 5549 email: stefanie.czub@inspection.gc.ca
Contact Info:
http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2
14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -
Final Abstract Number: ISE.114
Session: International Scientific Exchange
Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America
update October 2009
T. Singeltary
Bacliff, TX, USA
Background:
An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.
Methods:
12 years independent research of available data
Results:
I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.
Conclusion:
I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.
page 114 ;
http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/14th_ICID_ISE_Abstracts.pdf
PRODUCT Red Blood Cells. Recall # B-2300-10 CODE Unit: W001607702825 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Department of the Air Force, Wright Patterson AFB, OH, by letter dated April 8, 2008. Manufacturer: Depart of Air Force 88th Medical Group SGQC WPAFB, Wright Patterson AFB, OH. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Blood product, collected from a donor who was at risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), was distributed. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 1 unit DISTRIBUTION Japan
___________________________________
PRODUCT Recovered Plasma. Recall # B-2302-10 CODE Units: R08951; P90041; P90041 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Blood Center of Northcentral Wisconsin, Inc., Wausau, WI, by fax on January 2, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Blood products, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 3 units DISTRIBUTION NY
___________________________________
PRODUCT 1) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced. Recall # B-2338-10; 2) Plasma Frozen. Recall # B-2339-10 CODE 1) and 2) Unit: 5039861 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Community Blood Center, Inc., Appleton, WI, by letter dated September 21, 2007 or by electronic notification on September 21, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Blood products, collected from a donor who was at risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 2 units DISTRIBUTION WI, Switzerland
___________________________________
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 22, 2010
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/ucm227078.htm
PRODUCT
1) Cryoprecipitated AHF, Pooled. Recall # B-2155-10;
2) Recovered Plasma. Recall # B-2156-10
CODE
1) Unit: W036309907231;
2) Unit: W036309616077
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
BloodCenter of Wisconsin, Inc., Milwaukee, WI, by fax and internet on May 5, 2010 and May 13, 2010. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Blood products, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
2 units
DISTRIBUTION
TX, Switzerland
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced. Recall # B-2157-10
CODE
Unit: 6371718
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
South Texas Blood & Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by telephone on January 23, 2010 and by fax on January 25, 2010. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Blood product, collected from a donor who failed to answer questions regarding risk for vCJD, was distributed.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
1 unit
DISTRIBUTION
TX
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Source Plasma. Recall # B-2212-10
CODE
Units: 09FMOG6851; 09FMOG3410; 09FMOG2756; 09FMOG1418; 09FMOF6640; 09FMOF2642; 09FMOF1554; 09FMOD7746; 09FMOF0063; 09FMOF7599
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
BioLife Plasma Service LP, Springfield, MO, by fax on April 1, 2010. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Blood products, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
10 units
DISTRIBUTION
CA
___________________________________
PRODUCT
1) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced. Recall # B-2213-10;
2) Recovered Plasma. Recall # B-2214
CODE
1) and 2) Unit: 6325245
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by facsimile on February 8, 2010. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Blood products, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
2 units
DISTRIBUTION
FL, TX
___________________________________
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 15, 2010
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/ucm225990.htm
PRODUCT Source Plasma. Recall # B-2056-10 CODE Units: FD0500537, FD0502880, FD0503259, FD0509894, FD0515518, FD0516063, FD0517957, FD0518606, FD0522255, FD0523346, FD0523544, FD0524204, FD0524698, FD0525142, FD0525845, FD0526653, FD0526878, FD0527579, FD0527845, FD0528519, FD0528827, FD0529544, FD0529761, FD0530471, FD0530712, FD0531425, FD0531801, FD0532483, FD0532869, FD0537501, FD0537687, FD0538370, FD0543210, FD0546250, FD0546632, FD0547328, FD0547832, FD0548286, FD0548743, FD0549325, FD0549840, FD0550427, FD0551448, FD0551572, FD0552307, FD0553173, FD0553418, FD0554063, FD0554834, FD0555041, FD0559685, FD0560235, FD0560592, FD0561168, FD0561786, FD0562212, FD0562883, FD0563248, FD0564435, FD0564723, FD0565467, FD0565880, FD0566540, FD0567053, FD0567723, FD0567965, FD0568941, FD0569180, FD0570057, FD0571177, FD0571477, FD0572411, FD0572818, FD0573582, FD0573871, FD0574531, FD0576955, FD0577140, FD0579983, FD0580403, FD0581156, FD0581623, FD0582680, FD0583090, FD0584073, FD0584500, FD0585410, FD0586089, FD0586790, FD0587500, FD0588791, FD0589023, FD0590248, FD0590600, FD0591592, FD0592445, FD0593277, FD0593712, FD0594626, FD0595049, FD0596132, FD0596519, FD0597701, FD0598681, FD0599198, FD0600210, FD0600690, FD0601755, FD0602401, FD0603415, FD0603985, FD0605122, FD0608608, FD0609074, FD0609979, FD0610508, FD0611469, FD0612006, FD0612905 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER DCI Biologicals LLC, Farmington, NM, by facsimile on September 26, 2009 and electronic mail dated January 15, 2010. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Blood products, collected from a donor who was at risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 119 units DISTRIBUTION NY, UK
___________________________________
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 8, 2010
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/ucm225223.htm
PRODUCT Source Plasma. Recall # B-2134-10 CODE Units: 3910020431, 3910019695, 3910018715, 3910018227, 3910017100, 3910016675, 3910015596, 3910015120, 3910014175, 3910013575, 3910012934, 3910012281, 3910010102, 3910009899, 3910007715, 3910007430 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Talecris Plasma Resources, Inc., N Las Vegas, NV, by fax on July 17, 2009. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Blood products, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 16 units DISTRIBUTION NC
___________________________________
PRODUCT 1) Red Blood Cells. Recall # B-2215-10; 2) Fresh Frozen Plasma. Recall # B-2216-10 CODE 1) and 2) Unit: 0951592 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Memorial Blood Centers, Saint Paul, MN, by letter on November 5, 2008. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Blood products, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 2 units DISTRIBUTION MN
___________________________________
PRODUCT Recovered Plasma. Recall # B-2217-10 CODE Unit: 0951592 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Memorial Blood Centers, Saint Paul, MN, by letter on November 5, 2008. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Blood product, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), was distributed. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 1 unit DISTRIBUTION MN
___________________________________
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 1, 2010
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/ucm224723.htm
Variant CJD: where has it gone, or has it?
The recent identification of a possible clinical case of vCJD in an individual with an MV genotype3 reinforces the long held concern that there may be further waves of vCJD cases in individuals with a non-MM codon 129 genotype. Mathematical models suggest that the number of MV and VV cases will be limited and not exceed the primary MM outbreak, but predicting infectious outbreaks is an imprecise science, as may be inferred from the recent swine flu epidemic which never materialised, at least not to the extent predicted. The adage that 'Essentially, all models are wrong but some are useful' (George Edwin Pelham Box, 2007), reinforces the need for caution in predicting the future course of the vCJD outbreak. There is also the possibility that the phenotype of vCJD may be influenced by the genetic background. It is reassuring therefore that the recent possible MV case was identified on the basis of the clinical features as this may indicate that any further such cases will also be recognised as vCJD.
However, there is clearly still a continuing need to look for new phenotypes of human prion disease. Novel forms of animal prion diseases have been identified in recent years, including atypical scrapie and the rare H and L forms of atypical BSE, probably as a result of the extensive abattoir testing of animal populations. Atypical BSE has been transmitted to a range of laboratory animals, and in a primate model the incubation period was shorter than with conventional BSE and the clinical and pathological phenotype different.4
The incubation period in human prion disease can extend to decades and there are continuing concerns and uncertainties that indicate that there are good reasons to continue research and surveillance in vCJD, despite the clear decline in the primary outbreak of vCJD.
Tuesday, September 28, 2010
Variant CJD: where has it gone, or has it?
Pract Neurol 2010; 10: 250-251
http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/2010/09/variant-cjd-where-has-it-gone-or-has-it.html
Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program
An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.
4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf
Audit Report Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program  Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service
Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III
Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006
Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle Still Remain
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything they did before 2005 suspect," Brown said.
http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060315-055557-1284r
LET'S take a closer look at this new prionpathy or prionopathy, and then let's look at the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow.
This new prionopathy in humans? the genetic makeup is IDENTICAL to the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow, the only _documented_ mad cow in the world to date like this, ......wait, it get's better. this new prionpathy is killing young and old humans, with LONG DURATION from onset of symptoms to death, and the symptoms are very similar to nvCJD victims, OH, and the plaques are very similar in some cases too, bbbut, it's not related to the g-h-BSEalabama cow, WAIT NOW, it gets even better, the new human prionpathy that they claim is a genetic TSE, has no relation to any gene mutation in that family. daaa, ya think it could be related to that mad cow with the same genetic make-up ??? there were literally tons and tons of banned mad cow protein in Alabama in commerce, and none of it transmitted to cows, and the cows to humans there from ??? r i g h t $$$
ALABAMA MAD COW g-h-BSEalabama
In this study, we identified a novel mutation in the bovine prion protein gene (Prnp), called E211K, of a confirmed BSE positive cow from Alabama, United States of America. This mutation is identical to the E200K pathogenic mutation found in humans with a genetic form of CJD. This finding represents the first report of a confirmed case of BSE with a potential pathogenic mutation within the bovine Prnp gene. We hypothesize that the bovine Prnp E211K mutation most likely has caused BSE in "the approximately 10-year-old cow" carrying the E221K mutation.
http://www.plospathogens.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156
http://www.plospathogens.org/article/fetchObjectAttachment.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1000156&representation=PDF
Saturday, August 14, 2010
BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY
(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)
http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/bse-case-associated-with-prion-protein.html
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html
Wednesday, July 28, 2010
re-Freedom of Information Act Project Number 3625-32000-086-05, Study of Atypical BSE UPDATE July 28, 2010
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/07/re-freedom-of-information-act-project.html
Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.
http://www.prion2009.com/sites/default/files/Prion2009_Book_of_Abstracts.pdf
REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY 1989
snip...
4.2.9 ...Also, if it resulted from a localised chance transmission of the scrapie strain from sheep to cattle giving rise to a mutant, a different pattern of disease would have been expected: its range would have increased with time. Thus the evidence from Britain is against the disease being due to a new strain of the agent, but we note that in the United States from 1984 to 1988 outbreaks of scrapie in sheep flocks are reported to have Increased markedly, now being nearly 3 times as high as during any previous period (18).
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102132706/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ib/ibd1/tab02.pdf
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102193106/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m12/tab12.pdf
CJD TEXAS 38 YEAR OLD FEMALE WORKED SLAUGHTERING CATTLE EXPOSED TO BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD MATTER
" Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods where she worked on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them for packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she would euthanize the cattle."
Irma Linda Andablo CJD Victim, she died at 38 years old on February 6, 2010 in Mesquite Texas
Irma Linda Andablo CJD Victim, she died at 38 years old on February 6, 2010 in Mesquite Texas. She left 6 Kids and a Husband. The Purpose of this web is to give information in Spanish to the Hispanic community, and to all the community who want's information about this terrible disease.-
Physician Discharge Summary, Parkland Hospital, Dallas Texas
Admit Date: 12/29/2009
Discharge Date: 1/20/2010
Attending Provider: Greenberg, Benjamin Morris;
General Neurology Team: General Neurology Team
Linda was a Hispanic female with no past medical history presents with 14 months of incresing/progressive altered mental status, generalized weakness, inability to walk, loss of appetite, inability to speak, tremor and bowel/blader incontinence. She was, in her usual state of health up until February, 2009, when her husbans notes that she began forgetting things like names and short term memories. He also noticed mild/vague personality changes such as increased aggression. In March, she was involved in a hit and run MVA,although she was not injured. The police tracked her down and ticketed her. At that time, her son deployed to Iraq with the Army and her husband assumed her mentation changes were due to stress over these two events. Also in March, she began to have weakness in her legs, making it difficult to walk. Over the next few months, her mentation and personality changes worsened, getting to a point where she could no longer recognized her children. She was eating less and less. She was losing more weight. In the last 2-3 months, she reached the point where she could not walk without an assist, then 1 month ago, she stopped talking, only making grunting/aggressive sounds when anyone came near her. She also became both bowel and bladder incontinent, having to wear diapers. Her '"tremor'" and body jerks worsened and her hands assumed a sort of permanent grip position, leading her family to put tennis balls in her hands to protect her fingers. The husband says that they have lived in Nebraska for the past 21 years. They had seen a doctor there during the summer time who prescribed her Seroquel and Lexapro, Thinking these were sx of a mood disorder. However, the medications did not help and she continued to deteriorate clinically.
Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods where she worked on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them for packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she would euthanize the cattle. The husband says that he does not know any fellow workers with a similar illness. He also says that she did not have any preceeding illness or travel.
http://www.recordandoalinda.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19:cjd-english-info&catid=9:cjd-ingles&Itemid=8
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. has added the following comment:
"According to the World Health Organisation, the future public health threat of vCJD in the UK and Europe and potentially the rest of the world is of concern and currently unquantifiable. However, the possibility of a significant and geographically diverse vCJD epidemic occurring over the next few decades cannot be dismissed .
The key word here is diverse. What does diverse mean?
If USA scrapie transmitted to USA bovine does not produce pathology as the UK c-BSE, then why would CJD from there look like UK vCJD?"
SEE FULL TEXT ;
http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:568933508083034::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,82101
.57 The experiment which might have determined whether BSE and scrapie were caused by the same agent (ie, the feeding of natural scrapie to cattle) was never undertaken in the UK. It was, however, performed in the USA in 1979, when it was shown that cattle inoculated with the scrapie agent endemic in the flock of Suffolk sheep at the United States Department of Agriculture in Mission, Texas, developed a TSE quite unlike BSE. 32 The findings of the initial transmission, though not of the clinical or neurohistological examination, were communicated in October 1988 to Dr Watson, Director of the CVL, following a visit by Dr Wrathall, one of the project leaders in the Pathology Department of the CVL, to the United States Department of Agriculture. 33 The results were not published at this point, since the attempted transmission to mice from the experimental cow brain had been inconclusive. The results of the clinical and histological differences between scrapie-affected sheep and cattle were published in 1995. Similar studies in which cattle were inoculated intracerebrally with scrapie inocula derived from a number of scrapie-affected sheep of different breeds and from different States, were carried out at the US National Animal Disease Centre. 34 The results, published in 1994, showed that this source of scrapie agent, though pathogenic for cattle, did not produce the same clinical signs of brain lesions characteristic of BSE.
32 Clark, W., Hourrigan, J. and Hadlow, W. (1995) Encephalopathy in Cattle Experimentally Infected with the Scrapie Agent, American Journal of Veterinary Research, 56, 606-12
33 YB88/10.00/1.1
http://web.archive.org/web/20040823105233/www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1988/10/00001001.pdf
Monday, August 9, 2010
National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined (July 31, 2010)
(please watch and listen to the video and the scientist speaking about atypical BSE and sporadic CJD and listen to Professor Aguzzi)
SEE where sporadic cjd in the USA went from 59 cases in 1997, to 216 cases in 2009. a steady increase since 1997. ...TSS
http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf
see full text ;
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/08/national-prion-disease-pathology.html
Friday, August 27, 2010
NEW ATYPICAL NOR-98 SCRAPIE CASE DETECTED IDAHO NOW 5 CASES DOCUMENTED 2010
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2010/08/new-atypical-nor-98-scrapie-case.html
THIS is just ONE month report, of TWO recalls of prohibited banned MBM, which is illegal, mixed with 85% blood meal, which is still legal, but yet we know the TSE/BSE agent will transmit blood. we have this l-BSE in North America that is much more virulent and there is much concern with blood issue and l-BSE as there is with nvCJD in humans. some are even starting to be concerned with sporadic CJD and blood, and there are studies showing transmission there as well. ... this is one month recall page, where 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE, TO BE FED OUT. very little of the product that reaches commerce is ever returned via recall, very, very little. this was 2007, TEN YEARS AFTER THE AUGUST 4, 1997, PARTIAL AND VOLUNTARY MAD COW FEED BAN IN THE USA, that was nothing but ink on paper. i have listed the tonnage of mad cow feed that was in ALABAMA in one of the links too, this is where the infamous g-h-BSEalabama case was, a genetic relation matching the new sporadic CJD in the USA. seems this saga just keeps getting better and better.......$$$
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm
Tuesday, March 2, 2010
Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed/Adulterated/Misbranded Rangen Inc 2/11/10 USA
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-proteins-prohibited-in-ruminant.html
Monday, March 1, 2010
ANIMAL PROTEIN I.E. MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE A REVIEW 2010
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-protien-ie-mad-cow-feed-in.html
Tuesday, September 14, 2010
Feed Safety and BSE/Ruminant Feed Ban Support Project (U18)
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/09/feed-safety-and-bseruminant-feed-ban.html
Friday, October 8, 2010
Scientific reasons for a feed ban of meat-and-bone meal, applicable to all farmed animals including cattle, pigs, poultry, farmed fish and pet food
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/10/scientific-reasons-for-feed-ban-of-meat.html
Friday, October 15, 2010
BSE infectivity in the absence of detectable PrPSc accumulation in the tongue and nasal mucosa of terminally diseased cattle
http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/10/bse-infectivity-in-absence-of.html
Thursday, October 07, 2010
Experimental Transmission of H-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy to Bovinized Transgenic Mice
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/10/experimental-transmission-of-h-type.html
Friday, August 20, 2010
USDA: Animal Disease Traceability August 2010
http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/2010/08/usda-animal-disease-traceability-august.html
Wednesday, September 08, 2010
Emerging Infectious Diseases: CJD, BSE, SCRAPIE, CWD, PRION, TSE Evaluation to Implementation for Transfusion and Transplantation September 2010
http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/2010/09/emerging-infectious-diseases-cjd-bse.html
Sunday, October 3, 2010
Scrapie, Nor-98 atypical Scrapie, and BSE in sheep and goats North America, who's looking ?
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2010/10/scrapie-nor-98-atypical-scrapie-and-bse.html
Wednesday, September 08, 2010
CWD PRION CONGRESS SEPTEMBER 8-11 2010
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2010/09/cwd-prion-2010.html
Thursday, August 12, 2010
Seven main threats for the future linked to prions
http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/seven-main-threats-for-future-linked-to.html
http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/
layperson
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 flounder9@verizon.net