Sunday, June 9, 2013

TSEAC March 14, 2013: Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Meeting Webcast

March 14, 2013: Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Meeting Webcast




Webcast


























































































































Volume 19, Number 7—July 2013




Dispatch


Asynchronous Onset of Clinical Disease in BSE-Infected Macaques


Judith Montag1, Walter Schulz-Schaeffer, Annette Schrod, Gerhard Hunsmann, and Dirk Motzkus Author affiliations: German Primate Center, Göttingen, Germany (J. Montag, A. Schrod, G. Hunsmann, D. Motzkus); University of Göttingen, Göttingen (W. Schulz-Schaeffer)


Abstract


To estimate the effect of the variability of prion disease onset on primary bovine spongiform encephalopathy transmission to humans, we studied 6 cynomolgus macaques. The preclinical incubation period was significantly prolonged in 2 animals, implying that onset of variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease in humans could be more diverse than previously expected.


Prion diseases, such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in cattle, scrapie in sheep, and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in humans, are fatal, transmissible, neurodegenerative disorders associated with the aggregation of an infectivity-associated isoform (PrPSc) of the cellular prion protein (PrP) (1). Seventeen years ago, it became apparent that the BSE-infectious agent had entered the food chain and was identified as the causative agent for a new variant CJD (vCJD) (2). Since then, several risk assessment studies have investigated the number of expected vCJD cases in human populations (reviewed in [3]). Although thousands to millions of consumers of beef products were estimated to be affected, thus far only a few more than 200 vCJD cases have been observed worldwide.


This discrepancy was assumed to be attributable to the so-called species barrier, defined as the hindrance of an infectious agent to change its natural host. Upon crossing the species barrier, prion diseases often show a low attack rate in conjunction with a high variability in the preclinical incubation time. Thus, the consumption of BSE-contaminated products may have led either to a restricted infection or to a prolonged asymptomatic phase in some exposed persons. Therefore, concerns have been raised that asymptomatic carriers of vCJD might exist, posing a risk for unintentional human-to-human transmission.


First indications that transmission of BSE to primates may lead to variances in the preclinical incubation times were obtained by inoculating cynomolgus macaques with cattle-derived BSE material (4–6), even though in those studies not more than 3 animals were used. We have now used a group of 6 macaques that were infected with BSE at a comparable age and kept under identical and controlled experimental conditions.


The Study Six captive-bred female cynomolgus macaques (Macaca fascicularis, purchased from the Centre de Recherche en Primatologie, Mauritius) were inoculated intracerebrally with 1 dose of 50 mg brain homogenate (10% wt/vol) derived from 11 BSE-infected cattle. Animal experimentation was performed in accordance with section 8 of the German Animal Protection Law in compliance with Directive 86/609/EEC. Macaques were housed in a social group, and behavioral changes were assessed on a daily basis by experienced animal care takers.


After inoculation, all 6 macaques remained healthy and asymptomatic for >30 months (Table). At 931 days postinfection, 1 animal showed indications of slight coordination disorders. Within a few days, afferent ataxia developed, and when the animal was separated from the others animals, she apparently became tame. After 2 weeks, the animal showed severe dysmetria of the extremities without obvious myoclonia. Dementia was apparent but could not be diagnosed by objective measures. For ethical reasons, the animal was euthanized 17 days after disease onset. Within the next 14 weeks, 3 more animals became symptomatic. After appearance of neurologic symptoms (ataxia, tremors), the affected animals were occasionally separated from the group when symptoms became more severe or attacks from asymptomatic animals occurred. The disease course in these animals was comparable to that of the first animal, but the progression was slower (91–103 days).


Figure 1


Figure 1. . Survival of intracerebrally BSE-infected cynomolgus macaques. Six age- and sex-matched cynomolgus macaques were inoculated intracerebrally with 50 mg brain homogenate (10% in sucrose) derived from 11 BSE-infected cattle. Macaques were...


Two of the 6 animals remained asymptomatic for ≈1 additional year. Although daily monitoring was facilitated by the fact that only 2 macaques remained and that the caretakers were more experienced to recognize minor changes in behavior, symptoms were first detected 1,340 and 1,398 days postinfection, respectively. Clinical signs were similar to those observed in the previous 4 animals. The symptomatic periods before euthanasia for these macaques lasted 103 and 143 days, respectively (Table). Direct comparison revealed that the difference between the short (931–1,025 days) and the long (1,340–1,398 days) preclinical incubation time was statistically significant (Figure 1, log-rank [Mantel-Cox] test, p<0 .05="" div="">

Test results of brain samples from all animals were positive for macaque-adapted BSE by Western blot analysis. In brief, brain tissue from each animal was homogenized and subjected to proteinase K (PK) treatment for 1 h at 37°C. Samples were separated on acrylamide gels and transferred to nitrocellulose membranes. Macaque-adapted BSE (PrPSc) was detected by using the monoclonal anti-PrP antibody 11C6. PK-resistant PrP was detected in all 6 macaques, confirming that BSE was transmitted to the animals.


Figure 2


Figure 2. . PrPSc profile of macaque-adapted BSE in comparison to human CJD. Brain homogenates from human sCJD type 1, sCJD type 2, vCJD, and BSE-infected macaques were subjected to PK treatment, separated...


The individual glycopattern and band migration of macaque-adapted PrPSc was compared with human sporadic CJD (sCJD) type 1, sCJD type 2, and vCJD. PK-resistant PrP from BSE-infected macaques co-migrated with type 2 sCJD and was clearly distinguishable from type 1 sCJD (Figure 2). The glycosylation pattern of macaque-adapted BSE was comparable with vCJD (6,7), which is characterized by an overrepresentation of diglycosylated PrPSc (8,9). Using 11C6 antibody (10), we detected a slightly decreased signal of the diglycosylated PrPSc isoform for sCJD, vCJD, and macaque-adapted BSE. We assume that this effect is related to a reduced affinity of the diglycosylated isoform to 11C6 that otherwise shows high sensitivity to macaque-adapted PrPSc. Nevertheless, direct comparison showed a higher amount of the diglysosylated PrPSc isoform in vCJD and macaque-adapted BSE than sCJD, which was also shown with a different monoclonal antibody, 3F4. This finding confirms that BSE transmission to macaques is comparable with, and can be used as a model for, human vCJD infection.


Conclusions


Several susceptibility studies using nonhuman primates as a model for human prion diseases hint to heterogeneity of the preclinical incubation period upon crossing the species barrier (5,11,12). However, because of the low number of no more than 3 animals, this variability was not always evident (4). Therefore, there was an urgent need to determine whether the transmission of BSE to humans is likely to lead to a similar diversity.


Our study using 6 cynomolgus macaques shows that the transmission of BSE to primates led to a significantly prolonged asymptomatic phase in 2 animals. Disease onset is influenced by several factors (13). Our study design enabled us to exclude that the route of transmission influenced the disease progression because the infectious agent was injected into the same brain region of each animal. Also, a limited infectious dose cannot be responsible, as shown by the attack rate of 100%. In addition, endogenous factors, such as age, the MM genotype at codon 129 (Table), and housing conditions, were comparable for all macaques.


Thus, we conclude that the variable asymptomatic phase is most likely influenced by the infectious agent (14) or the genomic diversity of the macaques (13). The animals in our study were not inbred. Therefore, differences in the genomic background may have influenced the time of disease onset. In contrast, the PrPSc migration patterns of the animals give no indications for different types or strains that evolved from the mixed BSE inoculum. However, further studies will have to verify this.


Nevertheless, during the BSE epidemics, the human population with its natural genomic diversity was also exposed to a nonhomogenous prion source. Therefore, our study closely mimics the human situation. Our results imply that a prolonged asymptomatic phase can be expected for vCJD. In light of the transmissibility of vCJD through blood transfusions (15), our findings emphasize the need for continued attention to the risks of secondary human-to-human transmission.


Dr Montag is a microbiologist at the Department of Molecular and Cell Physiology at the Hannover Medical School. Her primary research interests are the molecular mechanisms of disease pathology, including prion disorders and inherited cardiac diseases.


Acknowledgments We thank J.P. Deslys for providing vCJD material.


This study was supported by European Union grant QLK1-CT-2002-01096 and BMH4-CT-98-6029.


References




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Monday, October 10, 2011


EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story


snip...


EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded. Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.




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Thursday, August 12, 2010


Seven main threats for the future linked to prions


First threat


The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed.


***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.


Second threat


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Tuesday, March 05, 2013


A closer look at prion strains Characterization and important implications Prion


7:2, 99–108; March/April 2013; © 2013 Landes Bioscience








Friday, April 19, 2013


APHIS 2013 Stakeholder Meeting (March 2013) BSE TSE PRION








Monday, May 6, 2013


Warning of mad cow disease threat to blood transfusions








Sunday, May 19, 2013


CJD BLOOD SCREENING, DONORS, AND SILENT CARRIERS House of Commons Written Answers 16 May 2013








Tuesday, May 21, 2013


CJD, TSE, PRION, BLOOD Abstracts of the 23rd Regional Congress of the International Society of Blood Transfusion, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, June 2-5, 2013








Tuesday, March 5, 2013


Use of Materials Derived From Cattle in Human Food and Cosmetics; Reopening of the Comment Period FDA-2004-N-0188-0051 (TSS SUBMISSION)


FDA believes current regulation protects the public from BSE but reopens comment period due to new studies









FC5.1.1


Transmission Results in Squirrel Monkeys Inoculated with Human sCJD, vCJD, and GSS Blood Specimens: the Baxter Study


Brown, P1; Gibson, S2; Williams, L3; Ironside, J4; Will, R4; Kreil, T5; Abee, C3 1Fondation Alliance BioSecure, France; 2University of South Alabama, USA; 3University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center, USA; 4Western General Hospital, UK; 5Baxter BioSience, Austria


Background: Rodent and sheep models of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) have documented blood infectivity in both the pre-clinical and clinical phases of disease. Results in a (presumably more appropriate) non-human primate model have not been reported.


Objective: To determine if blood components (red cells, white cells, platelets, and plasma) from various forms of human TSE are infectious.


Methods: Blood components were inoculated intra-cerebrally (0.1 ml) and intravenously (0.5 ml) into squirrel monkeys from 2 patients with sporadic Creutzfeldt- Jakob disease (sCJD) and 3 patients with variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD). Additional monkeys were inoculated with buffy coat or plasma samples from chimpanzees infected with either sCJD or Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker disease (GSS). Animals were monitored for a period of 5 years, and all dying or sacrificed animals had post-mortem neuropathological examinations and Western blots to determine the presence or absence of the misfolded prion protein (PrPTSE).


Results: No transmissions occurred in any of the animals inoculated with blood components from patients with sporadic or variant CJD. All donor chimpanzees (sCJD and GSS) became symptomatic within 6 weeks of their pre-clinical phase plasmapheresis, several months earlier than the expected onset of illness. One monkey inoculated with purified leukocytes from a pre-clinical GSS chimpanzee developed disease after 36 months.


Conclusion: No infectivity was found in small volumes of blood components from 4 patients with sporadic CJD and 3 patients with variant CJD. ***However, a single transmission from a chimpanzee-passaged strain of GSS shows that infectivity may be present in leukocytes, and the shock of general anaesthesia and plasmspheresis appears to have triggered the onset of illness in pre-clinical donor chimpanzees.






Saturday, September 5, 2009


TSEAC MEETING FEBRUARY 12, 2004 THE BAXTER STUDY GSS


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Saturday, September 5, 2009


TSEAC MEETING FEBRUARY 12, 2004 THE BAXTER STUDY GSS


snip...see full text ;


Monday, May 6, 2013


Warning of mad cow disease threat to blood transfusions









Tuesday, April 30, 2013


Mad cow infected blood 'to kill 1,000’








Sunday, February 10, 2013


Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) biannual update (February 2013) Infection report/CJD







Tuesday, May 28, 2013


Late-in-life surgery associated with Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: a methodological outline for evidence-based guidance








Thursday, June 6, 2013


BSE TSE PRION USDA FDA MAD COW FEED COMPLIANCE REPORT and NAI, OAI, and VAI ratings as at June 5, 2013








Thursday, February 14, 2013


The Many Faces of Mad Cow Disease Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE and TSE prion disease








Saturday, December 15, 2012


Bovine spongiform encephalopathy: the effect of oral exposure dose on attack rate and incubation period in cattle -- an update 5 December 2012









Thursday, May 30, 2013


World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) has upgraded the United States' risk classification for mad cow disease to "negligible" from "controlled", and risk further exposing the globe to the TSE prion mad cow type disease


U.S. gets top mad-cow rating from international group and risk further exposing the globe to the TSE prion mad cow type disease










Friday, December 14, 2012


Susceptibility Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) in wild cervids to Humans 2005 - December 14, 2012








Sunday, June 2, 2013


Characterisation of an Unusual TSE in a Goat by Transmission in Knock-in Transgenic Mice








Monday, June 3, 2013


Unsuccessful oral transmission of scrapie from British sheep to cattle


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I have often pondered if the whole damn mad cow follies started over here in the USA, and somehow, the USA shipped it over to the UK ?


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but I still am not so sure that the mad cow follies did not start long ago right here in the USA i.e. Richard Marsh and deadstock downer cattle to those mink, and then the USA shipped it to hell and back. just pondering out loud here. ...tss






The exact same recipe for B.S.E. existed in the U.S. for years




and years. In reading over the Qualitative Analysis of BSE




Risk Factors-1, this is a 25 page report by the




USDA:APHIS:VS. It could have been done in one page. The




first page, fourth paragraph says it all;




"Similarities exist in the two countries usage of continuous




rendering technology and the lack of usage of solvents,




however, large differences still remain with other risk factors




which greatly reduce the potential risk at the national level."




Then, the next 24 pages tries to down-play the high risks of




B.S.E. in the U.S., with nothing more than the cattle to sheep




ratio count, and the geographical locations of herds and flocks.




That's all the evidence they can come up with, in the next 24




pages.






Something else I find odd, page 16;






"In the United Kingdom there is much concern for a specific




continuous rendering technology which uses lower




temperatures and accounts for 25 percent of total output. This




technology was _originally_ designed and imported from the




United States. However, the specific application in the




production process is _believed_ to be different in the two




countries."






A few more factors to consider, page 15;






"Figure 26 compares animal protein production for the two




countries. The calculations are based on slaughter numbers,




fallen stock estimates, and product yield coefficients. This




approach is used due to variation of up to 80 percent from




different reported sources. At 3.6 million tons, the United




States produces 8 times more animal rendered product than




the United Kingdom."






"The risk of introducing the BSE agent through sheep meat and




bone meal is more acute in both relative and absolute terms in




the United Kingdom (Figures 27 and 28). Note that sheep




meat and bone meal accounts for 14 percent, or 61 thousand




tons, in the United Kingdom versus 0.6 percent or 22 thousand




tons in the United States. For sheep greater than 1 year, this is




less than one-tenth of one percent of the United States supply."




"The potential risk of amplification of the BSE agent through




cattle meat and bone meal is much greater in the United States




where it accounts for 59 percent of total product or almost 5




times more than the total amount of rendered product in the




United Kingdom."






Considering, it would only take _one_ scrapie infected sheep




to contaminate the feed. Considering Scrapie has run rampant




in the U.S. for years, as of Aug. 1999, 950 scrapie infected




flocks. Also, Considering only one quarter spoonful of scrapie




infected material is lethal to a cow. Considering all this, the




sheep to cow ration is meaningless. As I said, it's 24 pages of




B.S.e.




To be continued...




Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA




_____________________________________________________________________











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Saturday, June 25, 2011




Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus Macaque




"BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades"




Emmanuel Comoy,1,† Valérie Durand,1 Evelyne Correia,1 Sophie Freire,1 Jürgen Richt,2 Justin Greenlee,3 Juan-Maria Torres,4 Paul Brown,1 Bob Hills5 and Jean-Philippe Deslys1




1Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France; 2Kansas State University; Manhattan, KS USA; 3USDA; Ames, IA USA; 4INIA; Madrid, Spain; 5Health Canada; Ottawa, ON Canada†Presenting author; Email: emmanuel.comoy@cea.fr




The epidemiology of Transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) indicates an alimentary origin. Several inter-species transmission experiments have not succeeded in establishing with certainty any natural reservoir of this prion strain, although both ovine and bovine sources have been suspected. Cattle exposed to TME develop a spongiform encephalopathy that is distinct from classical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (c-BSE).




Inoculation of c-BSE to cynomolgus macaque provided early evidence of a possible risk to humans, and remains an important model to define the risk of both primary (oral transmission from cattle to primate) and secondary (intravenous intra-species transmission) exposures. We have also evaluated the transmissibility of other cattle prion strains to macaques, including L- and H- atypical forms of BSE, namely BSE-L and BSE-H, and cattle-adapted TME.




BSE-L induced a neurological disease distinct from c-BSE. Peripheral exposures demonstrate the transmissibility of BSE-L by oral, intravenous, and intra-cerebral routes, with incubation periods similar to c-BSE. Cattle-adapted TME also induced a rapid disease in cynomolgus macaque. The clinical features, lesion profile, and biochemical signature of the induced disease was similar to the features observed in animals exposed to BSE-L, suggesting a link between the two prion strains. Secondary transmissions to a common host (transgenic mouse overexpressing bovine PrP) of cattle-TME and BSE-L before or after passage in primates induced diseases with similar incubation periods: like the c-BSE strain, these cattle strains maintained their distinctive features regardless of the donor species and passages.




If the link between TME and BSE-L is confirmed, our results would suggest that BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades, and highlight a possible preferential transmission of animal prion strains to primates after passage in cattle.






=====================end...tss====================




link url not available, please see PRION 2011 ;




















ALSO, SEE Scrapie Mission, Texas, did not produce _typical_ BSE...






see page 17 here ;




snip...see full text ;




Monday, June 3, 2013


Unsuccessful oral transmission of scrapie from British sheep to cattle








*** The potential impact of prion diseases on human health was greatly magnified by the recognition that interspecies transfer of BSE to humans by beef ingestion resulted in vCJD. While changes in animal feed constituents and slaughter practices appear to have curtailed vCJD, there is concern that CWD of free-ranging deer and elk in the U.S. might also cross the species barrier. Thus, consuming venison could be a source of human prion disease. Whether BSE and CWD represent interspecies scrapie transfer or are newly arisen prion diseases is unknown. Therefore, the possibility of transmission of prion disease through other food animals cannot be ruled out. There is evidence that vCJD can be transmitted through blood transfusion. There is likely a pool of unknown size of asymptomatic individuals infected with vCJD, and there may be asymptomatic individuals infected with the CWD equivalent. These circumstances represent a potential threat to blood, blood products, and plasma supplies.








*** The discovery of previously unrecognized prion diseases in both humans and animals (i.e., Nor98 in small ruminants) demonstrates that the range of prion diseases might be wider than expected and raises crucial questions about the epidemiology and strain properties of these new forms. We are investigating this latter issue by molecular and biological comparison of VPSPr, GSS and Nor98.






VARIABLY PROTEASE-SENSITVE PRIONOPATHY IS TRANSMISSIBLE ...price of prion poker goes up again $


OR-10: Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy is transmissible in bank voles


Romolo Nonno,1 Michele Di Bari,1 Laura Pirisinu,1 Claudia D’Agostino,1 Stefano Marcon,1 Geraldina Riccardi,1 Gabriele Vaccari,1 Piero Parchi,2 Wenquan Zou,3 Pierluigi Gambetti,3 Umberto Agrimi1 1Istituto Superiore di Sanità; Rome, Italy; 2Dipartimento di Scienze Neurologiche, Università di Bologna; Bologna, Italy; 3Case Western Reserve University; Cleveland, OH USA


Background. Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy (VPSPr) is a recently described “sporadic”neurodegenerative disease involving prion protein aggregation, which has clinical similarities with non-Alzheimer dementias, such as fronto-temporal dementia. Currently, 30 cases of VPSPr have been reported in Europe and USA, of which 19 cases were homozygous for valine at codon 129 of the prion protein (VV), 8 were MV and 3 were MM. A distinctive feature of VPSPr is the electrophoretic pattern of PrPSc after digestion with proteinase K (PK). After PK-treatment, PrP from VPSPr forms a ladder-like electrophoretic pattern similar to that described in GSS cases. The clinical and pathological features of VPSPr raised the question of the correct classification of VPSPr among prion diseases or other forms of neurodegenerative disorders. Here we report preliminary data on the transmissibility and pathological features of VPSPr cases in bank voles.


Materials and Methods. Seven VPSPr cases were inoculated in two genetic lines of bank voles, carrying either methionine or isoleucine at codon 109 of the prion protein (named BvM109 and BvI109, respectively). Among the VPSPr cases selected, 2 were VV at PrP codon 129, 3 were MV and 2 were MM. Clinical diagnosis in voles was confirmed by brain pathological assessment and western blot for PK-resistant PrPSc (PrPres) with mAbs SAF32, SAF84, 12B2 and 9A2.


Results. To date, 2 VPSPr cases (1 MV and 1 MM) gave positive transmission in BvM109. Overall, 3 voles were positive with survival time between 290 and 588 d post inoculation (d.p.i.). All positive voles accumulated PrPres in the form of the typical PrP27–30, which was indistinguishable to that previously observed in BvM109 inoculated with sCJDMM1 cases.


In BvI109, 3 VPSPr cases (2 VV and 1 MM) showed positive transmission until now. Overall, 5 voles were positive with survival time between 281 and 596 d.p.i.. In contrast to what observed in BvM109, all BvI109 showed a GSS-like PrPSc electrophoretic pattern, characterized by low molecular weight PrPres. These PrPres fragments were positive with mAb 9A2 and 12B2, while being negative with SAF32 and SAF84, suggesting that they are cleaved at both the C-terminus and the N-terminus. Second passages are in progress from these first successful transmissions.


Conclusions. Preliminary results from transmission studies in bank voles strongly support the notion that VPSPr is a transmissible prion disease. Interestingly, VPSPr undergoes divergent evolution in the two genetic lines of voles, with sCJD-like features in BvM109 and GSS-like properties in BvI109.


The discovery of previously unrecognized prion diseases in both humans and animals (i.e., Nor98 in small ruminants) demonstrates that the range of prion diseases might be wider than expected and raises crucial questions about the epidemiology and strain properties of these new forms. We are investigating this latter issue by molecular and biological comparison of VPSPr, GSS and Nor98.









Wednesday, March 28, 2012


VARIABLY PROTEASE-SENSITVE PRIONOPATHY IS TRANSMISSIBLE, price of prion poker goes up again $






Volume 33, Issue 3, Article first published online: 20 JAN 2013


Special Lecture


Human prion diseases: Molecular, cellular and population biology


Mark W. Head


National CJD Research & Surveillance Unit, Centre for Clinical Brain Sciences, School of Clinical Sciences,


The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK


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Potential future zoonoses


Scrapie is endemic in many countries around the world, yet there is no evidence to suggest that it is pathogenic for humans. The intense investigations of ruminant TSEs that followed the BSE epidemic have resulted in the identification of several distinct animal prion diseases, atypical or Nor98 scrapie in sheep and H-type and L-type BSE in cattle.32 Moreover, BSE is experimentally transmissible to sheep and there are concerns that if BSE were to have infected the national flock in the UK its presence might be masked by endemic scrapie, but it might retain its pathogenicity for humans.33,34 Another concern, particularly for the North American countries, is the spread of chronic wasting disease in farmed and free-ranging deer and elk.35 There is no known epidemiological link between any of these animal prion diseases and human disease, but there are active efforts to try to quantify strain-related species barriers between the diseases known to be a risk (BSE/ vCJD), those thought not to represent a risk (scrapie) and those for which data is lacking (atypical scrapie, H- and L-type BSE and BSE in sheep).36 In assessing whether or not human prion diseases might have an animal origin, it is important to have a proper understanding of the clinicopathological heterogeneity of the sporadic human prion diseases, because it is against this backdrop that any new acquired forms of the disease will be seen and from which it will need to be distinguished.


Sporadic CJD and variably protease-sensitive prionopathy


Sporadic CJD is the most commonly occurring human prion disease; it occurs world-wide and it has long been known to be clinically and pathologically heterogeneous. The molecular basis for this heterogeneity is currently thought to reside in a combination of the PRNP codon 129 polymorphic status of the patient (MM, MV, or VV) and the type (type 1 or type 2) of the protease-resistant component of PrPSc determined by protease K digestion and Western blotting (termed PrPres).37,38 The original sCJD sub-classification system of Parchi et al. that recognized six sCJD subtypes (MM1/MV1, MM2c, MM2t, MV2,VV2 and VV1) has had to be modified to accommodate the growing number of cases recognized to contain both type 1 and type 2 PrPres in different or sometimes the same regions of the brain.39,40 Moreover, intensive surveillance and investigation of forms of human prion disease that lack PRNP mutation and known risk factors has identified another sporadic human prion disease, termed protease-sensitive prionopathy (VPSPr).41While intensively investigated, the etiology and diversity of the sporadic human prion diseases remain poorly understood.


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There is also a potentially important practical corollary to the idea of prion-like spread, which may affect future stem cell therapies for neurodegenerative diseases. Presumably therapeutic stem cell-derived neurons would be equally susceptible to “infection” (with misfolded protein aggregates) as the patient’s own cells, unless steps were taken to prevent this,55 the most obvious of which would be to prevent expression of the gene product that can be converted to a pathological prion-like isoform.The suggestion that a prion-like mechanism of spread of molecular pathology underlies diseases as diverse as Alzheimer’s disease and Parkinson’s disease has led some researchers to explore whether the molecular pathology of these diseases is transmissible in an experimental setting56–58 and to suggest that perhaps some cases of these more common neurodegenerative illnesses might, like CJD, be acquired.58,59


snip...


MOLECULAR BASIS OF HUMAN PRION DISEASES Molecular strain typing Molecular strain typing in the form of classifying the mobility and glycoform ratio of protease-resistant prion protein byWestern blotting is a remarkably useful adjunct to neuropathological assessment during the post-mortem diagnosis of human prion diseases (Fig. 1). The glycoform ratio difference between vCJD and all forms of sCJD is a remarkably robust phenomenon, although the mechanism underlying it remains obscure. All cases of vCJD examined show type 2B PrPres, irrespective of brain region assayed and the PrPres type is also found in lymphoreticular tissues, albeit with presumably tissue-specific minor modification of mobility and an accentuation of the glycoform ratio. Similarly sCJD cases are characterized by a narrow range of glycoform ratios, distinct from vCJD, and the presence of either type 1 or type 2 PrPres (type 1A and type 2A).The PrPres types found in the brain in iCJD and kuru resemble those found in sCJD (type 1A and type 2A), from which they were presumably derived. Individual cases of gCJD, GSS and FFI usually have type 1 or type 2 PrPres, but with a glycoform ratio in which the non-glycosylated component is under-represented (which we have termed A/B). However, this is not always true and a broad spectrum of glycoform ratios can be found in genetic prion diseases. Moreover, some cases of GSS are characterized by an approximately 8 kDa (N- and C-terminally truncated) PrPres fragment, and some cases of FFI have little detectable PrPres at all. Despite the diagnostic utility, a simple one-to-one correspondence between PrPres type and disease phenotype (and by implication to agent strain) seems unlikely in principle and is complicated by the facts. First, the choice of analyzing only that fraction of PrPSc which survives a particular concentration of protease may seem arbitrary. Second, the interpretation of a molecular population variable, such as glycosylation site occupancy, as conforming to two or three discrete types, could be seen as simplistic. Lastly, protease digestion may be considered to be a somewhat blunt instrument to distinguish secondary and higherorder conformational differences in PrPSc. Even when genotype (mutations and polymorphisms) is taken into account, three major types (1, 2, 8 kDa) and three wild-type genotypes (MM,MV and VV) provide insufficient molecular variation to account for all the phenotypic variations observed. For example, two forms of sCJD share methione homozygosity and type 2A PrPres but one form closely resembles FFI (without the causative mutation) and the other is CJD-like.8 Two more substantial problems, which may point toward a more subtle and perhaps informative approach to PrPSc analysis, are discussed below. The co-occurrence of PrPres types 1 and 2 Once controversial, the idea that PrPSc in individual cases might be composed of mixtures (or different types co-occurring) is now well recognized and accepted.40,70 There are probably two phenomena at play here. One is the finding of different predominant types in individual samples from different parts of the brain or more rarely approximately equal amounts of type 1A and type 2A in the same sCJD brain samples.The other is the observation made using antibodies that specifically recognize type 1 or type 2 PrPres, that a minority type always accompanies a majority type in sCJD and vCJD, albeit at sub-detectable levels when conventional antibodies are used.71–75 The former issue is more tractable and a consensus is beginning to emerge that when multiple brain sampling and sensitive co-detection is performed on cohorts of sCJD cases, a plateau is reached at between 30–40% of cases showing co-occurrence. Our own data examining four regions (temporal cortex, parietal cortex, occipital cortex and thalamus) instead of frontal cortex only, shows a rise in detected co-occurrence from 3% to 24% of cases.76 Interestingly, only very rarely did this re-analysis involve a change in the predominant type found in the brain overall. Parchi et al. have offered a revised version of their 1999 sporadic CJD classification system that adds mixed type to the original “pure” types and have shown that the most common of these 12 sCJD subtypes can be recognized on histological grounds, without reference to biochemical analysis.39,40,77 It will be interesting to see in the fullness of time whether this additional complexity reflects a more refined series of discrete clinicopathological phenotypes or whether it is indicative of a spectrum of phenotypes depending on the spacio-temporal accumulation of PrPSc types set against the patient genotype.78


Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy The phenotypic complexity of the sporadic forms of human prion disease has increased with the report of a new sporadic human prion disease, termed variably proteasesensitive prionopathy (VPSPr) that is distinct from previously recognized sub-types of sCJD.41,79 There are no mutations in the open reading frame of PRNP. The patients have no known risk factors for the disease, but the disease is most common in theVV genotype, as opposed to sCJD, which is most common in the MM genotype. The neuropathology involves medium-sized vacuolation and characteristic microplaques. Durations of illness can be very long and this coupled with symptoms that do not conform well to CJD have prompted speculation that the condition may be under-ascertained. The most interesting aspect of the disease from a biochemical perspective is that although PrPSc is abundantly present in the brain, PrPres is difficult to detect because of its sensitivity to proteolysis and because what remains after proteinase K (PK) digestion is both C- and N-terminally cleaved by PK digestion and seen as a faint 8 kDa band on Western blots (Fig. 2). The degree of protease resistance is reported to reflect the codon 129 genotype, withVV being least resistant andMM being most resistant, despite having the same 8 kDa PrPres fragment predominating.79We have identified two cases of VPSPr prospectively in the UK80,81 and recently completed a retrospective review for such cases confirming many of the original observations by Gambetti and colleagues.41,79 Our work has shown that some areas of the VPSPr brain contain PrPres similar in appearance to that found in sCJD and conversely that some cases of sCJD have a very minor PrPres band similar to the 8 kDa PrPres band that typifies VPSPr.82


snip...


The biochemical basis of the strain phenomenon The results of transmission of individual samples from single examples of the six different Parchi et al.39 sCJD subtypes (MM1/MV1, VV1, MM2c, MV2, VV2) into humanized transgenic mice suggest the existence of four distinct sCJD agents, termed M1, M2, V1 and V2, and a fifth strain corresponding to MM2t or sporadic fatal insomnia.99,100 Interestingly, when we performed formally analogous experiments in the cell-free PMCA reaction, similar results were obtained: The PrPres type of the seed was conserved in the PMCA product and the efficiency of conversion appeared to be determined by compatibility at codon 129 of PRNP.101 The behavior of the seeds from heterozygous patients were particularly interesting, in that MV1 sCJD seeds selectively amplified in MM substrate producing type 1 PrPres and MV2 sCJD seeds selectively amplified in VV substrate producing type 2 PrPres (Fig. 6). These results reinforce the association between methionine at codon 129 and the production of type 1 PrPres and valine at codon 129 and the production of type 2 PrPres.


EMERGING RISKS Zoonotic disease BSE is the only animal prion strain with demonstrated pathogenicity for humans.While it is tempting to suggest that scrapie might represent the animal reservoir that results in some cases of sCJD, there is no epidemiological evidence to support this hypothesis. The pathogenicity of new or newly described animal prion diseases for humans is unclear and this is particularly true for H- and L-type BSE, atypical scrapie and for chronic wasting disease (CWD), all of which are probably consumed. Human susceptibility has been modeled by attempted transmission to (humanized) transgenic mice with sometimes conflicting results, depending on the transgenic model used and depending upon whether central or peripheral tissues are examined.102–106 We have attempted to establish whether PMCA can model the molecular component of these hypothetical cross-species transmission events.107 The existing data correspond well with the established facts. First, PrPSc in vCJD brain samples amplifies most efficiently in humanized mouse MM substrate, less efficiently in MV substrate and not at all in VV. Cattle BSE PrPres is less efficient than vCJD, but shows the same substrate genotypic preference. Sheep scrapie fails to amplify detectably in any of the three substrates; however, sheep BSE PrPres does amplify, again with a codon 129 preference for methionine (Fig. 7). We are currently extending this approach to encompass atypical scrapie, H- and L-type BSE and CWD using human rather than humanized PMCA substrates.


Secondary infection


In the same way that animal reservoirs cannot be completely excluded as causes of individual sCJD cases, neither can other environmental sources, such as medical procedures. The known routes of iatrogenic CJD acquisition are historically growth hormone therapy, dura mater grafting, corneal grafting and certain highly specialized neurosurgical procedures. The secondary transmission of vCJD by blood transfusion and experimental evidence showing the efficiency of the transfusion of viable blood cells between scrapie and BSE-infected and naive sheep have prompted a reappraisal of transfusion-transmitted CJD, including consideration being given to the possibility of prion blood testing or filtration.25,26,108,109


Blood transfusion is the original and most extensively used cellular therapy, but we may be on the threshold of a new era of cellular therapies based on embryonic stem cell and induced pluripotent stem cell technologies. Although the potential for stem cell therapy-mediated prion transmission might be judged remote, this was also considered to be the case for transfusion transmission of CJD before 2004.


snip...




SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVE


While the prospect of a major epidemic of vCJD in the UK and elsewhere seems to be receding, there remain a series of uncertainties surrounding the eventual numbers of individuals that will suffer from this devastating condition.The issues include the effects of genotype on susceptibility and the possible existence of substantial numbers of asymptomatic infected individuals that may pose risks of onward transmission. sCJD remains the most frequently occurring human prion disease and arguably the least well understood. Other idiopathic forms of human prion disease (such as VPSPr), characterized by protease-sensitive forms of the prion protein, also exist and their true prevalence may be hard to ascertain. The possible risks from newly described animal prion diseases and from emerging cellular therapies are currently poorly quantified. On a more theoretic level the prion hypothesis has provided a unifying conceptual framework for TSE research and provided a paradigm to interrogate the similarities and differences between the diverse neurodegenerative conditions involving prion-like mechanisms of molecular pathology.










Sunday, March 31, 2013


Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease CJD worlds youngest documented victim, 11 years old, shall we pray








Tuesday, June 26, 2012


Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease Human TSE report update North America, Canada, Mexico, and USDA PRION UNIT as of May 18, 2012


type determination pending Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (tdpCJD), is on the rise in Canada and the USA








Monday, July 23, 2012


The National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center July 2012








2011 Monday, September 26, 2011


L-BSE BASE prion and atypical sporadic CJD









Wednesday, June 29, 2011


TSEAC Meeting August 1, 2011 donor deferral Saudi Arabia vCJD risk blood and blood products









Wednesday, June 29, 2011 TSEAC JUNE 2, 1999 Welcome to the FDA traveling road show From: TSS


Subject: TSEAC JUNE 2, 1999 Welcome to the FDA traveling road show


Date: October 15, 2007 at 3:18 pm PST


TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING Thursday, June 2, 1999









Wednesday, March 2, 2011


Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Meeting Transcript Posted: 3/2/2011 Posted: 3/2/2011


October 28, 2010


Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Meeting Transcript Posted: 3/2/2011









Monday, February 7, 2011



FDA’s Currently-Recommended Policies to Reduce the Possible Risk of Transmission of CJD and vCJD by Blood and Blood Products 2011 ???









October 29, 2010


Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Meeting Transcript Posted: 3/2/2011








Monday, October 18, 2010


TSEAC Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Draft Agenda and Meeting Materials,


Posted: 10/18/2010


Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Center Date Time Location










Tuesday, September 14, 2010


Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee; Notice of Meeting October 28 and 29, 2010 (COMMENT SUBMISSION)








Saturday, September 5, 2009



TSEAC MEETING FEBRUARY 12, 2004 THE BAXTER STUDY GSS









Sunday, May 10, 2009


Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Committee On June 12, 2009 (Singeltary submission)


TO : william.freas@fda.hhs.gov


May 8, 2009


Greetings again Dr. Freas, TSEAC et al,


I would kindly, once again, wish to comment at this meeting about the urgent actions that need to be taken asap, to the Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Committee On June 12, 2009. Due to my disability from my neck injury, I will not be attending this meeting either, however I hope for my submission to be read and submitted. ...


IN reply to ;








snip...see full text ;



Sunday, May 10, 2009



Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Committee On June 12, 2009 (Singeltary submission)



TO : william.freas@fda.hhs.gov







Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October 31, 2005 INTRODUCTION The United States Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) held a public meeting on July 25, 2006 in Washington, D.C. to present findings from the Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October 31, 2005 (report and model located on the FSIS website:




Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted to FSIS. Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S. Singeltary. This document provides itemized replies to the public comments received on the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the following points in mind:













From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.


To: FREAS@CBER.FDA.GOV


Cc: william.freas@fda.hhs.gov ; rosanna.harvey@fda.hhs.gov


Sent: Friday, December 01, 2006 2:59 PM


Subject: Re: TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006 [TSS SUBMISSION


snip...


ONE FINAL COMMENT PLEASE, (i know this is long Dr. Freas but please bear with me)


THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted blood from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone.


These are the facts as i have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species. ...


Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518



snip... 48 pages...










Wednesday, October 17, 2007 TSEAC MEETINGS ----- Original Message -----


From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.


To: FREAS@CBER.FDA.GOV


Cc: william.freas@fda.hhs.gov ; rosanna.harvey@fda.hhs.gov


Sent: Wednesday, November 29, 2006 1:24 PM


Subject: TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006 [TSSSUBMISSION]November 29, 2006


Greetings FDA, DHH, Dr. Freas, and Dr. Harvey et al,


a kind and warm Holiday Greetings to you all.i kindly wish to submit the following to the TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006, about the assessment for potential exposure to vCJD in human plasma-derivedantihemophilic factor (FVIII) productsmanufactured from U.S. plasma donors and related communication material ;




i see the media picked up on this as a 'low risk', from what the gov. agency perceived to be to them;






however, i seem to disagree. from my primitive ciphering, i see it another way. this is a huge catastrophic risk. 3 in 160 is 1.9%. so call that 2% which is 1 in 50 or twenty per thousand or 20,000 per million. also, wha tabout the mixed genotypes/mixed susceptibility?


what about the silent carriers that donated tainted blood?


what about the sporadic CJDs of UNKNOWN strain or phenotype?


this risk assessment is just more BSe to me. just another in a long line of industry fed crap. i pray that my assessment is the one that is wrong. but it is THEY who roll the dice with your life. it is THEY who refuse to regulate an industry that has run amok. just from are call aspect of potentially tainted blood, and these are just recent recalls ;


PRODUCT


Source Plasma, Recall # B-0054-7CODEUnits: 03MMNC5465, 03MMNC6361, 03MMNC6801, 03MMNC7510, 03MMNC7891,03MMNC8252, 03MMNC8801, 03MMNC9144, 03MMND1122, 03MMND1478, 03MMND1969,03MMND2350, 03MMND2825, 03MMND3211, 03MMND3708, 03MMND4072, 03MMND4588,03MMND4831, 03MMND5320, 03MMND5719, 03MMND6268, 03MMND6683, 03MMND7228,03MMND7656, 03MMND8211, 03MMND8652, 03MMND9195, 03MMND9618, 03MMNE0628,03MMNE0884, 03MMNE1597, 03MMNE1979, 03MMNE2644, 03MMNE3064, 03MMNE3707,03MMNE4122, 03MMNE4750, 03MMNE5080, 03MMNE5876, 03MMNE6218, 03MMNE7189,03MMNE7587, 03MMNE8027, 03MMNE8645, 03MMNE9029, 03MMNE9641, 03MMNE9979,03MMNF0491, 03MMNF0685, 03MMNF0937, 03MMNF1260, 04MMNA0351, 04MMNA0707,04MMNA1241, 04MMNA1650, 04MMNA2291, 04MMNA2646, 04MMNA3340, 04MMNA3719,04MMNA4312, 04MMNA4683, 04MMNA5298, 04MMNA5750, 04MMNA6407, 04MMNA6816,04MMNA7482, 04MMNA7915, 04MMNA8632, 04MMNA9076, 04MMNA9723, 04MMNB0063,04MMNB0696, 04MMNB1100, 04MMNB1845, 04MMNB2285, 04MMNB3035, 04MMNB3485,04MMNB4213, 04MMNB4672, 04MMNB5841, 04MMNB6652, 04MMNB7162, 04MMNB7930,04MMNB8453, 04MMNB9239, 04MMNB9747, 04MMNC0456, 04MMNC0931, 04MMNC1578


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


BioLife Plasma Services, L.P., Mankato, MN, by facsimile on June 4, 2004.


Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, collected from a donor who was at increased risk for new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (nvCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


89 units


DISTRIBUTION


CA and Austria


END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR October 25, 2006


###






USA FDA MAD COW BLOOD HUMANS RECALL (these are dime a dozen)RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: BIOLOGICS -- CLASS II


______________________________




PRODUCTSource Plasma, Recall # B-1708-6CODEUnits: MI180733, MI180927, MI181625, MI181780, MI182337, MI182519, MI183140,MI183311, MI183955, MI185006, MI185278, MI185822, MI186081, MI186855,MI187183, MI187903, MI188273, MI188695, MI189257, MI189553, MI190136,MI190473, MI191073, MI191395, MI191972, MI192303, MI193473, MI194343,04MINA0377, 04MINA0801, 05MINA7147, 05MINA7451, 05MINA8094, 05MINA8504,05MINA9548, 05MINA9883, 05MINB0489, 05MINB0875, 05MINB1469, 05MINB1874,05MINB3116, 05MINB7192, 05MINB7529, 05MINB8246, 05MINB8612, 05MINB9236,05MINB9366, 05MINB9475, 05MINB9641, 05MINC0031, 05MINC0237, 05MINC0336,05MINC0894, 05MINC0964, 05MINC1138, 05MINC1619, 05MINC1750, 05MINC1907,05MINC1977, 05MINC2375, 05MINC2774, 05MINC3113, 05MINC3484, 05MINC4277,05MINC4623, 05MINC5623, 05MINC5914, 05MINC7545, 05MINC7870, 05MINC8355,05MINC8689, 05MINC9437, 05MINC9775, 05MIND0067, 05MIND0393, 05MIND0892,05MIND0951, 05MIND1836, 05MIND2183 and 05MIND2962


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


BioLife Plasma Services L.P., Muncie, IN, by facsimile on November 22, 2005.


Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, collected from unsuitable donors based on risk factors for Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


80 units


DISTRIBUTION CA, NC, and MD


______________________________


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells, Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1714-6;b) Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # B-1715-6;c) Platelets, Recall # B-1716-6CODEa),


b), and c) Unit: 2443732RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by letters dated November 11, 2003 and December 18, 2003. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, collected from a donor who was at increased risk for new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (nvCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


3 units


DISTRIBUTION


TX and WI




END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 13, 2006


###






PRODUCT


Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # B-1751-6


CODE


Unit: 4936623


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


Gulf Coast Regional Blood Center, Houston, TX, by facsimile dated September 16, 2005.


Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood product, which was collected from an unsuitable donor based on risk factors for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), was distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


1 unit


DISTRIBUTION


TX


END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 6, 2006


###






Mon Aug 7, 2006 10:2471.248.132.189


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells, Recall # B-1587-6;b) Cryoprecipitated AHF, Recall # B-1588-6;c) Recovered Plasma, Recal # B-1589-6


CODE


a), b) and c)




Unit: 2016719




RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER




Walter Shepeard Community Blood Center, Inc., Augusta, GA, by facsimile on March 13, 2003.


Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


3 units


DISTRIBUTION


GA and Germany


______________________________


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1590-6;b) Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # B-1591-6


CODE


a) and b)


Unit: 2443595


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by facsimile on June30, 2004.


Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


2 units


DISTRIBUTION


TX


______________________________


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1592-6;b) Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # B-1593-6


CODEa) and b)


Unit: 2545596


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by facsimile on December 14, 2004 and January 3, 2005.


Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


2 units


DISTRIBUTION


TX


______________________________






PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1550-6;b) Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # B-1551-6


CODEa) and b)


Unit 2395371


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by fax on August 20,2003.


Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


2 units


DISTRIBUTION


TX


______________________________


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1552-6;b) Platelets, Recall # B-1553-6;c) Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # B-1554-6


CODE


a), b) and c)


Unit 2438702


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by fax on May 29,2003.


Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increasedrisk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


3 units


DISTRIBUTION


TX


______________________________


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1555-6;b) Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # B-1556-6


CODEa) and b)


Unit 2454970


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by fax on July 23 and December 11. 2003.


Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


2 units


DISTRIBUTION


TX


______________________________


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells, Recall # B-1494-6b) Cryoprecipitated AHF, Recall # B-1495-6


CODEa) and b)


Unit 5013100


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


Walter L. Shepeard Community Blood Center, Inc., Augusta, GA, by fax on May17, 2005. Firm initiated recall is complete.REASONBlood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


2 units


DISTRIBUTION


GA


______________________________


PRODUCT


Source Plasma, Recall # B-1450-6


CODE


Unit numbers ST0824313 and ST0824764


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


Stillwater Plasma Center LLC, Stillwater, OK, by fax on November 21, 2003.


Firm initiated recall is complete.REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor whose suitability pertaining to risk factors for Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD) was not adequately determined, were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


2 units


DISTRIBUTION


UK


______________________________




PRODUCT


Plasma Frozen, Recall # B-1422-6;Recovered Plasma, Recall # B-1423-6


CODE


a) Unit 03E42218;


b) Unit 03E38153


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


American Red Cross Blood Services, Atlanta, GA, by telephone, e-mail orletter on February 20 or 21, 2004. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


2 units


DISTRIBUTION


GA and Switzerland


______________________________


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1374-6;


b) Recovered Plasma, Recall # B-1375-6CODEa) and b) unit 2453906


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by fax on October 31 and November 5, 2003. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


2 units


DISTRIBUTION


TX and Austria


______________________________


PRODUCT


Source Plasma.


Recall # B-1295-6


CODE


Units: NG0046551, NG0045950


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERD


CI Biologicals Nacogdoches LLC, Nacogdoches, TX, by telephone and fax onDecember 20, 2002, Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, collected from a donor who did not answer the questions on the new variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (nvCJD) questionnaire appropriately, were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


2 units


DISTRIBUTION


KY


______________________________


PRODUCT


Source Plasma. Recall # B-1296-6


CODE


Unit: NG 0044520RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERDCI Biologicals Nacogdoches LLC, Nacogdoches, TX, by telephone and fax onDecember 12, 2002. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood product, collected from a donor who did not answer the questions on the new variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (nvCJD) questionnaire, was distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


1 unit


DISTRIBUTION


KY


______________________________


PRODUCT


Source Plasma. Recall # B-1297-6


CODE


Units: NG0042874, NG0043139, NG0043312, NG0043618, NG0043797, NG0044020,NG0044209, NG0044507, NG0044718, NG0044977, NG0045161, NG0045412, NG0045555RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERDCI Biologicals Nacogdoches LLC, Nacogdoches, TX, by telephone and fax onDecember 20, 2002. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


13 units


DISTRIBUTION


KY


______________________________


PRODUCT


Source Plasma, Recall # B-1298-6


CODE


Units: NG 0046823, NG 0046671, NG 0045205, NG 0044635, NG 0043095, NG0042525, NG 0042341RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERDCI Biologicals Nacogdoches LLC, Nacogdoches, TX, by telephone and fax onDecember 20, 2002. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, collected from a donor who answered questions on the variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (vCJD) questionnaire inappropriately, were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


7 units


DISTRIBUTION


KY


______________________________


PRODUCT


Recovered Plasma, Recall # B-1299-6CODEUnit: 4357117


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


Department of the Navy, Naval Medical Center, San Diego, CA, by fax and letter on September 25, 2003. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood product, collected from a donor considered to be at risk of exposure to Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease (CJD), was distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


1 unit


DISTRIBUTION


Germany


END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006


###






CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARD


TSS


FDA mad cow nvCJD 'only' blood recalls 1ST WEEK JULY Fri Jul 7, 2006 09:3770.110.83.160


FDA mad cow nvCJD 'only' blood recalls 1ST WEEK JULY


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1379-6;


b) Platelets, Recall # B-1380-6;


c) Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # 1381-6;


d) Recovered Plasma, Recall # B-1382-6


CODE


a) Unit numbers: 2343106, 2377779, and 2403533;


b) and c) Unit numbers: 2377779;


d) Unit numbers: 2343106 and 2403533




RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by facsimile on June12, 2003. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


7 units


DISTRIBUTIONTX and Austria


______________________________


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1467-6;


b) Recovered Plasma, Recall # B-1468-6


CODE


a) and b)


Unit numbers: 2329380


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by facsimile on May 8,2003. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


2 units


DISTRIBUTIONTX and Switzerland


______________________________


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1479-6;


b) Cryoprecipitated AHF, Recall # B-1480-6;


c) Recovered Plasma, Recall # B-1481-6


CODE


a), b), and c)


Unit numbers: 2383280


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by facsimile on July23 and 29, 2004. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASONBlood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


3 units


DISTRIBUTION


TX and Switzerland


______________________________


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1482-6;


b) Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # B-1483-6


CODE


a) and b)


Unit number: 2501452


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by facsimile onOctober 5, 2004. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


2 units


DISTRIBUTION


TX and NY


______________________________


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1484-6;


b) Plasma Cryoprecipitated Reduced, Recall # B-1485-6;


c) Recovered Plasma, Recall # B-1486-6


CODE


a) and c)


Unit number: 2554077;


b) Unit number: 2415708


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by facsimile on August13, 2004. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


3 units


DISTRIBUTION


TX and Austria


_____________________________________


END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 5, 2006


###






Greetings again Dr. Freas et al at FDA,



WITH new atypical TSE in the bovine, in the sheep, goat, and humans, and the fact that the new BASE TSE in cattle being very very similar to sporadic CJD, rather than the nvCJD, the fact that now science showing the TSE agent of the atypical cattle in Japan showing infectivity other than CNS tissue, the fact that the latest Texas mad cow and the recent Alabama mad cow both being of the atypical strain, it would seem prudent to include all human TSE in the blood ban, in my opinion. with sporadic CJD, you have many strains and or phenotypes, some of which are 'UNKNOWN', so we do not know how this will transmit, what tissues are infectious and or if blood transmits. that's the bottomline, however it has been reported that the BASE is more virulent to humans.With this, and the fact that sporadic CJD has tripled in the past few years or so, i see itas being prudent to take serious and immediate action ;






snip...see full text ;




Wednesday, October 17, 2007 TSEAC MEETINGS ----- Original Message -----


From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.


To: FREAS@CBER.FDA.GOV


Cc: william.freas@fda.hhs.gov ; rosanna.harvey@fda.hhs.gov


Sent: Wednesday, November 29, 2006 1:24 PM


Subject: TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006 [TSSSUBMISSION]November 29, 2006


Greetings FDA, DHH, Dr. Freas, and Dr. Harvey et al,


a kind and warm Holiday Greetings to you all.i kindly wish to submit the following to the TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006, about the assessment for potential exposure to vCJD in human plasma-derivedantihemophilic factor (FVIII) productsmanufactured from U.S. plasma donors and related communication material ;




i see the media picked up on this as a 'low risk', from what the gov. agency perceived to be to them;






however, i seem to disagree. from my primitive ciphering, i see it another way. this is a huge catastrophic risk. 3 in 160 is 1.9%. so call that 2% which is 1 in 50 or twenty per thousand or 20,000 per million. also, wha tabout the mixed genotypes/mixed susceptibility?


what about the silent carriers that donated tainted blood?


what about the sporadic CJDs of UNKNOWN strain or phenotype?


this risk assessment is just more BSe to me. just another in a long line of industry fed crap. i pray that my assessment is the one that is wrong. but it is THEY who roll the dice with your life. it is THEY who refuse to regulate an industry that has run amok. just from are call aspect of potentially tainted blood, and these are just recent recalls ;


PRODUCT


Source Plasma, Recall # B-0054-7CODEUnits: 03MMNC5465, 03MMNC6361, 03MMNC6801, 03MMNC7510, 03MMNC7891,03MMNC8252, 03MMNC8801, 03MMNC9144, 03MMND1122, 03MMND1478, 03MMND1969,03MMND2350, 03MMND2825, 03MMND3211, 03MMND3708, 03MMND4072, 03MMND4588,03MMND4831, 03MMND5320, 03MMND5719, 03MMND6268, 03MMND6683, 03MMND7228,03MMND7656, 03MMND8211, 03MMND8652, 03MMND9195, 03MMND9618, 03MMNE0628,03MMNE0884, 03MMNE1597, 03MMNE1979, 03MMNE2644, 03MMNE3064, 03MMNE3707,03MMNE4122, 03MMNE4750, 03MMNE5080, 03MMNE5876, 03MMNE6218, 03MMNE7189,03MMNE7587, 03MMNE8027, 03MMNE8645, 03MMNE9029, 03MMNE9641, 03MMNE9979,03MMNF0491, 03MMNF0685, 03MMNF0937, 03MMNF1260, 04MMNA0351, 04MMNA0707,04MMNA1241, 04MMNA1650, 04MMNA2291, 04MMNA2646, 04MMNA3340, 04MMNA3719,04MMNA4312, 04MMNA4683, 04MMNA5298, 04MMNA5750, 04MMNA6407, 04MMNA6816,04MMNA7482, 04MMNA7915, 04MMNA8632, 04MMNA9076, 04MMNA9723, 04MMNB0063,04MMNB0696, 04MMNB1100, 04MMNB1845, 04MMNB2285, 04MMNB3035, 04MMNB3485,04MMNB4213, 04MMNB4672, 04MMNB5841, 04MMNB6652, 04MMNB7162, 04MMNB7930,04MMNB8453, 04MMNB9239, 04MMNB9747, 04MMNC0456, 04MMNC0931, 04MMNC1578


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


BioLife Plasma Services, L.P., Mankato, MN, by facsimile on June 4, 2004.


Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, collected from a donor who was at increased risk for new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (nvCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


89 units


DISTRIBUTION


CA and Austria


END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR October 25, 2006


###






USA FDA MAD COW BLOOD HUMANS RECALL (these are dime a dozen)RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: BIOLOGICS -- CLASS II


______________________________




PRODUCTSource Plasma, Recall # B-1708-6CODEUnits: MI180733, MI180927, MI181625, MI181780, MI182337, MI182519, MI183140,MI183311, MI183955, MI185006, MI185278, MI185822, MI186081, MI186855,MI187183, MI187903, MI188273, MI188695, MI189257, MI189553, MI190136,MI190473, MI191073, MI191395, MI191972, MI192303, MI193473, MI194343,04MINA0377, 04MINA0801, 05MINA7147, 05MINA7451, 05MINA8094, 05MINA8504,05MINA9548, 05MINA9883, 05MINB0489, 05MINB0875, 05MINB1469, 05MINB1874,05MINB3116, 05MINB7192, 05MINB7529, 05MINB8246, 05MINB8612, 05MINB9236,05MINB9366, 05MINB9475, 05MINB9641, 05MINC0031, 05MINC0237, 05MINC0336,05MINC0894, 05MINC0964, 05MINC1138, 05MINC1619, 05MINC1750, 05MINC1907,05MINC1977, 05MINC2375, 05MINC2774, 05MINC3113, 05MINC3484, 05MINC4277,05MINC4623, 05MINC5623, 05MINC5914, 05MINC7545, 05MINC7870, 05MINC8355,05MINC8689, 05MINC9437, 05MINC9775, 05MIND0067, 05MIND0393, 05MIND0892,05MIND0951, 05MIND1836, 05MIND2183 and 05MIND2962


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


BioLife Plasma Services L.P., Muncie, IN, by facsimile on November 22, 2005.


Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, collected from unsuitable donors based on risk factors for Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


80 units


DISTRIBUTION CA, NC, and MD


______________________________


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells, Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1714-6;b) Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # B-1715-6;c) Platelets, Recall # B-1716-6CODEa),


b), and c) Unit: 2443732RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by letters dated November 11, 2003 and December 18, 2003. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, collected from a donor who was at increased risk for new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (nvCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


3 units


DISTRIBUTION


TX and WI




END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 13, 2006


###






PRODUCT


Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # B-1751-6


CODE


Unit: 4936623


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


Gulf Coast Regional Blood Center, Houston, TX, by facsimile dated September 16, 2005.


Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood product, which was collected from an unsuitable donor based on risk factors for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), was distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


1 unit


DISTRIBUTION


TX


END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 6, 2006


###






Mon Aug 7, 2006 10:2471.248.132.189


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells, Recall # B-1587-6;b) Cryoprecipitated AHF, Recall # B-1588-6;c) Recovered Plasma, Recal # B-1589-6


CODE


a), b) and c)




Unit: 2016719




RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER




Walter Shepeard Community Blood Center, Inc., Augusta, GA, by facsimile on March 13, 2003.


Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


3 units


DISTRIBUTION


GA and Germany


______________________________


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1590-6;b) Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # B-1591-6


CODE


a) and b)


Unit: 2443595


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by facsimile on June30, 2004.


Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


2 units


DISTRIBUTION


TX


______________________________


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1592-6;b) Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # B-1593-6


CODEa) and b)


Unit: 2545596


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by facsimile on December 14, 2004 and January 3, 2005.


Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


2 units


DISTRIBUTION


TX


______________________________






PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1550-6;b) Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # B-1551-6


CODEa) and b)


Unit 2395371


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by fax on August 20,2003.


Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


2 units


DISTRIBUTION


TX


______________________________


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1552-6;b) Platelets, Recall # B-1553-6;c) Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # B-1554-6


CODE


a), b) and c)


Unit 2438702


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by fax on May 29,2003.


Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increasedrisk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


3 units


DISTRIBUTION


TX


______________________________


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1555-6;b) Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # B-1556-6


CODEa) and b)


Unit 2454970


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by fax on July 23 and December 11. 2003.


Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


2 units


DISTRIBUTION


TX


______________________________


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells, Recall # B-1494-6b) Cryoprecipitated AHF, Recall # B-1495-6


CODEa) and b)


Unit 5013100


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


Walter L. Shepeard Community Blood Center, Inc., Augusta, GA, by fax on May17, 2005. Firm initiated recall is complete.REASONBlood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


2 units


DISTRIBUTION


GA


______________________________


PRODUCT


Source Plasma, Recall # B-1450-6


CODE


Unit numbers ST0824313 and ST0824764


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


Stillwater Plasma Center LLC, Stillwater, OK, by fax on November 21, 2003.


Firm initiated recall is complete.REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor whose suitability pertaining to risk factors for Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD) was not adequately determined, were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


2 units


DISTRIBUTION


UK


______________________________




PRODUCT


Plasma Frozen, Recall # B-1422-6;Recovered Plasma, Recall # B-1423-6


CODE


a) Unit 03E42218;


b) Unit 03E38153


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


American Red Cross Blood Services, Atlanta, GA, by telephone, e-mail orletter on February 20 or 21, 2004. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


2 units


DISTRIBUTION


GA and Switzerland


______________________________


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1374-6;


b) Recovered Plasma, Recall # B-1375-6CODEa) and b) unit 2453906


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by fax on October 31 and November 5, 2003. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


2 units


DISTRIBUTION


TX and Austria


______________________________


PRODUCT


Source Plasma.


Recall # B-1295-6


CODE


Units: NG0046551, NG0045950


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERD


CI Biologicals Nacogdoches LLC, Nacogdoches, TX, by telephone and fax onDecember 20, 2002, Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, collected from a donor who did not answer the questions on the new variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (nvCJD) questionnaire appropriately, were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


2 units


DISTRIBUTION


KY


______________________________


PRODUCT


Source Plasma. Recall # B-1296-6


CODE


Unit: NG 0044520RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERDCI Biologicals Nacogdoches LLC, Nacogdoches, TX, by telephone and fax onDecember 12, 2002. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood product, collected from a donor who did not answer the questions on the new variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (nvCJD) questionnaire, was distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


1 unit


DISTRIBUTION


KY


______________________________


PRODUCT


Source Plasma. Recall # B-1297-6


CODE


Units: NG0042874, NG0043139, NG0043312, NG0043618, NG0043797, NG0044020,NG0044209, NG0044507, NG0044718, NG0044977, NG0045161, NG0045412, NG0045555RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERDCI Biologicals Nacogdoches LLC, Nacogdoches, TX, by telephone and fax onDecember 20, 2002. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


13 units


DISTRIBUTION


KY


______________________________


PRODUCT


Source Plasma, Recall # B-1298-6


CODE


Units: NG 0046823, NG 0046671, NG 0045205, NG 0044635, NG 0043095, NG0042525, NG 0042341RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURERDCI Biologicals Nacogdoches LLC, Nacogdoches, TX, by telephone and fax onDecember 20, 2002. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, collected from a donor who answered questions on the variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (vCJD) questionnaire inappropriately, were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


7 units


DISTRIBUTION


KY


______________________________


PRODUCT


Recovered Plasma, Recall # B-1299-6CODEUnit: 4357117


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


Department of the Navy, Naval Medical Center, San Diego, CA, by fax and letter on September 25, 2003. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood product, collected from a donor considered to be at risk of exposure to Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease (CJD), was distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


1 unit


DISTRIBUTION


Germany


END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006


###






CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARD


TSS


FDA mad cow nvCJD 'only' blood recalls 1ST WEEK JULY Fri Jul 7, 2006 09:3770.110.83.160


FDA mad cow nvCJD 'only' blood recalls 1ST WEEK JULY


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1379-6;


b) Platelets, Recall # B-1380-6;


c) Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # 1381-6;


d) Recovered Plasma, Recall # B-1382-6


CODE


a) Unit numbers: 2343106, 2377779, and 2403533;


b) and c) Unit numbers: 2377779;


d) Unit numbers: 2343106 and 2403533




RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by facsimile on June12, 2003. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


7 units


DISTRIBUTIONTX and Austria


______________________________


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1467-6;


b) Recovered Plasma, Recall # B-1468-6


CODE


a) and b)


Unit numbers: 2329380


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by facsimile on May 8,2003. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


2 units


DISTRIBUTIONTX and Switzerland


______________________________


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1479-6;


b) Cryoprecipitated AHF, Recall # B-1480-6;


c) Recovered Plasma, Recall # B-1481-6


CODE


a), b), and c)


Unit numbers: 2383280


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by facsimile on July23 and 29, 2004. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASONBlood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


3 units


DISTRIBUTION


TX and Switzerland


______________________________


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1482-6;


b) Fresh Frozen Plasma, Recall # B-1483-6


CODE


a) and b)


Unit number: 2501452


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by facsimile onOctober 5, 2004. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


2 units


DISTRIBUTION


TX and NY


______________________________


PRODUCT


a) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced, Recall # B-1484-6;


b) Plasma Cryoprecipitated Reduced, Recall # B-1485-6;


c) Recovered Plasma, Recall # B-1486-6


CODE


a) and c)


Unit number: 2554077;


b) Unit number: 2415708


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by facsimile on August13, 2004. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Blood products, which were collected from a donor who may be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


3 units


DISTRIBUTION


TX and Austria


_____________________________________


END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 5, 2006


###






Greetings again Dr. Freas et al at FDA,


WITH new atypical TSE in the bovine, in the sheep, goat, and humans, and the fact that the new BASE TSE in cattle being very very similar to sporadic CJD, rather than the nvCJD, the fact that now science showing the TSE agent of the atypical cattle in Japan showing infectivity other than CNS tissue, the fact that the latest Texas mad cow and the recent Alabama mad cow both being of the atypical strain, it would seem prudent to include all human TSE in the blood ban, in my opinion. with sporadic CJD, you have many strains and or phenotypes, some of which are 'UNKNOWN', so we do not know how this will transmit, what tissues are infectious and or if blood transmits. that's the bottomline, however it has been reported that the BASE is more virulent to humans.With this, and the fact that sporadic CJD has tripled in the past few years or so, i see itas being prudent to take serious and immediate action ;













PDF]Freas, William TSS SUBMISSION


File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat -


Page 1. J Freas, William From: Sent: To: Subject: Terry S. Singeltary


Sr. [flounder@wt.net] Monday, January 08,200l 3:03 PM freas ...









Tuesday, February 8, 2011


U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001








Thursday, February 24, 2011


The risk of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease among UK patients with bleeding disorders, known to have received potentially contaminated plasma products











Wednesday, May 16, 2012


Alzheimer’s disease and Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy prion disease, Iatrogenic, what if ?


Proposal ID: 29403









Saturday, May 25, 2013


Brain homogenates from human tauopathies induce tau inclusions in mouse brain

 







Tuesday, May 21, 2013


IS ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE A PRION DISEASE? the possible secondary transmission by blood transfusion are posed









Tuesday, May 7, 2013


Proteinopathies, a core concept for understanding and ultimately treating degenerative disorders?










Monday, September 26, 2011


Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy, Prionpathy, Prionopathy, FFI, GSS, gCJD, hvCJD, sCJD, TSE, PRION, update 2011










Friday, September 3, 2010


Alzheimer's, Autism, Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, Parkinson's, Prionoids, Prionpathy, Prionopathy, TSE

 
 








Tuesday, June 4, 2013


INTERPRETING RESULTS OF FSIS VERIFICATION SAMPLING OF DOMESTIC BEEF PRODUCT DERIVED FROM ADVANCED MEAT RECOVERY SYSTEMS (AMR01/FAMR01) FSIS Notice 38-12
















 
 


 
 
 



 
 











 












TSS

Wednesday, June 29, 2011

TSEAC Meeting August 1, 2011 donor deferral Saudi Arabia vCJD risk blood and blood products

Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee

Center Date Time Location

CBER August 1, 2011 9:00 a.m. - 4:30 p.m.

Hilton Washington DC/North, 620 Perry Pkwy., Gaithersburg, MD

Agenda

On August 1, 2011, in the morning, the committee will discuss donor deferral for time spent in Saudi Arabia to reduce the risk of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) by blood and blood products and human cells, tissues and cellular and tissue-based products.

Meeting Materials

Materials for this meeting will be available at:

http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/BloodVaccinesandOtherBiologics/default.htm1

Public Participation Information

Interested persons may present data, information, or views, orally or in writing, on issues pending before the committee.

Written submissions may be made to the contact person on or before July 25, 2011

Oral presentations from the public will be scheduled between approximately 2:15 p.m. and 2:45 p.m. Those individuals interested in making formal oral presentations should notify the contact person and submit a brief statement of the general nature of the evidence or arguments they wish to present, the names and addresses of proposed participants, and an indication of the approximate time requested to make their presentation on or before July 15, 2011. Time allotted for each presentation may be limited. If the number of registrants requesting to speak is greater than can be reasonably accommodated during the scheduled open public hearing session, FDA may conduct a lottery to determine the speakers for the scheduled open public hearing session. The contact person will notify interested persons regarding their request to speak by July 18, 2011.

Contact Information

Bryan Emery or Rosanna Harvey 1401 Rockville Pike, HFM-71, Rockville, MD 20852 301-827-1277 FAX: 301-827-0294 e-mail: Bryan.Emery@fda.hhs.gov or email: Rosanna.Harvey@fda.hhs.gov

FDA Advisory Committee Information Line 1-800-741-8138 (301-443-0572 in the Washington, DC, area) code 3014512391. Please call the Information Line for up-to-date information on this meeting.

FDA intends to make background material available to the public no later than 2 business days before the meeting. If FDA is unable to post the background material on its Web site prior to the meeting, the background material will be made publicly available at the location of the advisory committee meeting, and the background material will be posted on FDA’s Web site after the meeting.

A notice in the Federal Register about last minute modifications that impact a previously announced advisory committee meeting cannot always be published quickly enough to provide timely notice. Therefore, you should always check the agency’s Web site and call the appropriate advisory committee hot line/phone line to learn about possible modifications before coming to the meeting. Persons attending FDA’s advisory committee meetings are advised that the agency is not responsible for providing access to electrical outlets. FDA welcomes the attendance of the public at its advisory committee meetings and will make every effort to accommodate persons with physical disabilities or special needs. If you require special accommodations due to a disability, please contact Bryan Emery or Pearline Muckelvene at least 7 days in advance of the meeting. FDA is committed to the orderly conduct of its advisory committee meetings.

Please visit our Web site at

http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/AboutAdvisoryCommittees/ucm111462.htm


for procedures on public conduct during advisory committee meetings.

Notice of this meeting is given under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. app. 2).

http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/Calendar/ucm261240.htm



Greetings Doctor Emery et al @ TSEAC,


I wish to kindly submit the following Meeting August 1, 2011 donor deferral Saudi Arabia vCJD risk blood and blood products.

My main concern is the denial of the same risk factors from atypical CJDs here in the USA from the many overly abundant strains of TSE in animals and man.

IF the study below (see Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus Macaque "BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades", IF this comes to be true, as i have believed it to be for years and years, IT is not Saudi Arabia risk factor you should be addressing, it should be the risk factor there from here in the USA and all of North America.

AS the strains, sub-strains of TSE continue to emerge and spread, more and more humans and animals for human and animal consumption will be exposed.

WE know there is some sort of risk factor from the BAXTER study on GSS and blood. WE see now that the Nor-98 atypical scrapie, H-BSE, L-BSE, TME, GSS and some sporadic CJD, all seem to be connected in some way to each other. all of which have been documented in North America. it would be negligent in my opinion to omit this from risk factor assessments. by the time the dots are connected, it will be too late. If accumulation plays a roll, and we accumulate enough of different typical and atypical TSE, what is the threshold from exposure to sub-clinical to clinical (especially now that we know more than one type of TSE can infect a species) ? you cannot answer that. nor can anyone else. so you continue to roll the dice for everyone. we must include all human Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy in donor deferral, and we must take an urgent and serious look at Alzheimer's and blood donor risk factor there from, in my opinion.

I hope you can submit this to the TSEAC meeting. if not, please.........PLEASE take time to read the recent scientific studies. the tides turning, however slow it may be, and the science seems to be coming together to show what i have been saying for 14 years. however, it may take another 2 decades for officials and industry to connect the dots$ or admit$ by then it will be much too late.

(please note, the blogs i post my research of data on TSE too, please note i do NOT advertise. i make no money. i simply made a promise to my Mother. i also think science and the truth there from, should be free. i simply use these blogs as a tool to educate the public. ...tss)



please see the follow ;



Bio.108: Transmission of Prion Disease by Multiple, Clinically-Relevant Blood Components Following a Single Blood Transfusion

Sandra McCutcheon,2,† Anthony R. Alejo Blanco,2 E. Fiona Houston,1 Christopher de Wolf,2 Boon Chin Tan,2 Nora Hunter,2 Valerie Hornsey,3 Ian R. MacGregor,3 Christopher V. Prowse,3 Marc Turner3, 4 and Jean C. Manson2

1The University of Glasgow; Glasgow, UK; 2The Roslin Institute and R(D)SVS, University of Edinburgh; Edinburgh, UK; 3Scottish National Blood Transfusion Service; Edinburgh, UK; 4The University of Edinburgh; Edinburgh, UK;†Presenting author; Email: sandra.mccutcheon@roslin.ed.ac.uk

Variant CJD (vCJD) is an incurable, infectious human disease, likely arising from the consumption of BSE-contaminated meat products. While the epidemic appears to be waning, there is much concern that vCJD infection may be amplified/prolonged in humans by the transfusion of contaminated blood products. Since 2004, several cases of transfusion-associated vCJD transmission have been reported. Using the most appropriate animal model available, in which the disease manifested resembles that of humans affected with vCJD, we examined which blood components used in human medicine are likely to pose the greatest risk of transmitting vCJD via transfusion. We collected two full units of blood from BSE-infected donor animals during the pre-clinical phase of infection. Using methods employed by transfusion services we prepared red cell concentrates, plasma and platelets units (including leucoreduced equivalents). Following transfusion to recipients, we showed that all components contain sufficient levels of infectivity to cause disease following only a single transfusion and also that leucoreduction did not prevent disease transmission. These data suggest that all blood components can act as potential vectors for prion transmission and highlight the importance of multiple control measures to minimize the risk of human to human transmission of vCJD by blood transfusion.


PPPM.18: Induction of Ab Amyloidogenesis In Vivo by Blood Transfusion

Rodrigo Morales,1,† Claudia Duran-Aniotz,1, 2 Akihiko Urayama,1 Lisbell Estrada,3 Diego Morales-Scheihing1, 2 and Claudio Soto1

1University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston; Houston, TX USA; 2Universidad de Los Andes; Santiago, Chile; 3Universidad Catolica de Chile; Santiago, Chile†Presenting author; Email: Rodrigo.MoralesLoyola@uth.tmc.edu

Alzheimer disease (AD) is the most common type of senile dementia. Disease manifestation is characterized by progressive impairment of memory and cognition which is triggered by synaptic dysfunction and neuronal loss. Compelling evidence suggests that misfolding and aggregation of Ab is a hallmark event in the disease pathogenesis. An important unanswered question related to AD involves its etiology since over 90% of the AD cases arise sporadically. Interestingly, misfolding and aggregation of proteins is the main feature of other diseases -termed Protein Misfolding Disorders (PMDs)] which include Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSEs), among others. Convincing experimental evidences have shown that the only component of the infectious agent in TSEs is the misfolded form of the prion protein. Strikingly, the molecular mechanisms responsible for prion replication are very similar to the process of amyloid formation in all PMDs, suggesting that all these diseases have the inherent capability of being transmissible. Recent reports have shown that intra-cerebral and intra-peritoneal administration of brain homogenates containing Ab aggregates can accelerate the generation of senile plaques in mice models of AD. However, it remains to be demonstrated if this phenomenon can occur by more relevant routes of administration. The aim of this study was to assess whether AD pathogenesis can be induced intravenously, mimicking the know transmission of prion diseases through blood transfusion. For this purpose we used young tg2576 mice which were injected with blood obtained from 12 months old tg2576 mice (AD-blood) that contains a substantial quantity of cerebral Ab deposits. Mice were sacrificed at 250 days old, a time in which these animals scarcely develop Ab deposits. Interestingly, we observed that infusion of AD-blood induces substantial Ab accumulation in animals that without treatment or injected with wild type blood would barely have any detectable Ab lesion. Plaque deposition was mainly present in cortex and hippocampus, being more abundant in the former. In addition, we observed a decrease in memory in mice challenged with AD-blood. Other features such as brain inflammation and synaptic integrity were also measured. Importantly, similar results were obtained in a second and independent experiment performed in a double transgenic mouse model that develops AD plaques as early as 4 months old. Our results indicate that an AD-like pathogenesis can be induced by intravenous administration of AD-blood, presumably through induction of protein misfolding in a similar way as prion diseases. These findings may open a new avenue to understand the origin of sporadic AD and may provide new strategies for disease intervention and prevention.


http://www.prion2011.ca/files/PRION_2011_-_Posters_(May_5-11).pdf


Sunday, June 26, 2011

Risk Analysis of Low-Dose Prion Exposures in Cynomolgus Macaque

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/risk-analysis-of-low-dose-prion.html



Saturday, June 25, 2011

Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus Macaque

"BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades"

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/transmissibility-of-bse-l-and-cattle.html



Thursday, June 23, 2011

Experimental H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy characterized by plaques and glial- and stellate-type prion protein deposits

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/experimental-h-type-bovine-spongiform.html



Monday, June 27, 2011

Comparison of Sheep Nor98 with Human Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy and Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker Disease

http://prionopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/comparison-of-sheep-nor98-with-human.html


IN reference to the above study, please see ;


Bio.001: Protease-Sensitive Synthetic Prions and Evidence that Tg9949 Mice Do Not Spontaneously Generate Prions

David Colby1,† and Stanley Prusiner2

1University of Delaware; Newark, DE USA; 2University of California, San Francisco; San Francisco, CA USA†Presenting author; Email: colby@udel.edu

The resistance of many forms of PrPSc to protease digestion provides a convenient assay used to identify the presence of prions in tissue samples. However, protease-sensitive prions (sPrPSc) have also been isolated, and many prion strains have been found to be composed of mixtures of sPrPSc and protease resistant prions (rPrPSc). We have generated novel synthetic prions, composed of wild-type PrP, which are serially transmissible in two lines of transgenic mice, result in neuropathology indicative of prion disease, and cause a conformational change in PrP that is not accompanied by resistance to proteinase K. Inoculation of recombinant PrP of residues 89-230, refolded into an amyloid conformation, into Tg9949 mice resulted in the generation of these protease-sensitive prions. In control experiments, Tg9949 mice, which overexpress an N-terminally truncated form of PrP, were found to be prone to late onset neurological dysfunction distinct from prion disease. Control Tg9949 mice lacked both prion neuropathology and any detectable change in the conformation of PrP. Repeated serial passage of age-matched brain material from control Tg9949 mice did not generate prions. Our results demonstrate that sPrPSc of wild-type sequence can be pathogenic and transmissible and suggest that the contribution of sPrPSc may be overlooked in many studies that rely on the measurement of rPrPSc alone.

http://www.prion2011.ca/files/PRION_2011_-_Posters_(May_5-11).pdf


Monday, May 23, 2011

Atypical Prion Diseases in Humans and Animals 2011

Top Curr Chem (2011)

DOI: 10.1007/128_2011_161

# Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Michael A. Tranulis, Sylvie L. Benestad, Thierry Baron, and Hans Kretzschmar

Abstract

Although prion diseases, such as Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in humans and scrapie in sheep, have long been recognized, our understanding of their epidemiology and pathogenesis is still in its early stages. Progress is hampered by the lengthy incubation periods and the lack of effective ways of monitoring and characterizing these agents. Protease-resistant conformers of the prion protein (PrP), known as the "scrapie form" (PrPSc), are used as disease markers, and for taxonomic purposes, in correlation with clinical, pathological, and genetic data. In humans, prion diseases can arise sporadically (sCJD) or genetically (gCJD and others), caused by mutations in the PrP-gene (PRNP), or as a foodborne infection, with the agent of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) causing variant CJD (vCJD). Person-to-person spread of human prion disease has only been known to occur following cannibalism (kuru disease in Papua New Guinea) or through medical or surgical treatment (iatrogenic CJD, iCJD). In contrast, scrapie in small ruminants and chronic wasting disease (CWD) in cervids behave as infectious diseases within these species. Recently, however, so-called atypical forms of prion diseases have been discovered in sheep (atypical/Nor98 scrapie) and in cattle, BSE-H and BSE-L. These maladies resemble sporadic or genetic human prion diseases and might be their animal equivalents. This hypothesis also raises the significant public health question of possible epidemiological links between these diseases and their counterparts in humans.

M.A. Tranulis (*)

Norwegian School of Veterinary Science, Oslo, Norway

e-mail: Michael.Tranulis@nvh.no

S.L. Benestad

Norwegian Veterinary Institute, Oslo, Norway

T. Baron

Agence Nationale de Se´curite´ Sanitaire, ANSES, Lyon, France

H. Kretzschmar

Ludwig-Maximilians University of Munich, Munich, Germany

Keywords Animal Atypical Atypical/Nor98 scrapie BSE-H BSE-L Human Prion disease Prion strain Prion type

http://resources.metapress.com/pdf-preview.axd?code=f433r34h34ugg617&size=largest


snip...

SEE FULL TEXT AND MUCH MORE HERE;

Monday, May 23, 2011

Atypical Prion Diseases in Humans and Animals 2011

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/05/atypical-prion-diseases-in-humans-and.html


Monday, June 27, 2011

Zoonotic Potential of CWD: Experimental Transmissions to Non-Human Primates

http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2011/06/zoonotic-potential-of-cwd-experimental.html



Tuesday, June 14, 2011

Clinical research in CJD at a U.S. clinical prion research center: CJD Quinacrine Study results and improved diagnosis of prion disease

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/clinical-research-in-cjd-at-us-clinical.html


Sunday, May 01, 2011

STUDY OF ATYPICAL BSE 2010 Annual Report May 2011

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/05/study-of-atypical-bse-2010-annual.html


Friday, June 03, 2011

Estimation of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease infectivity titers in human blood

http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/2011/06/estimation-of-variant-creutzfeldt-jakob.html


Saturday, May 14, 2011

USA Blood products, collected from a donor who was at risk for vCJD, were distributed Nationally and Internationally MAY 11, 2011

http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/2011/05/usa-blood-products-collected-from-donor.html


Sunday, May 1, 2011

W.H.O. T.S.E. PRION Blood products and related biologicals May 2011

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/05/who-tse-prion-blood-products-and.html


Saturday, April 30, 2011

Blood product, collected from a donor who was at risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD), was distributed APRIL 27, 2011

http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/2011/04/blood-product-collected-from-donor-who.html


Sunday, March 6, 2011

U.K. and U.S.A. vCJD, CJD, TSE screen (a) the blood supply and (b) blood donors Commons Hansard Written Answers and FDA March 2011

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/uk-and-usa-vcjd-cjd-tse-screen-the.html


Saturday, March 5, 2011

MAD COW ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE RISE IN NORTH AMERICA

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/mad-cow-atypical-cjd-prion-tse-cases.html


Tuesday, April 26, 2011

sporadic CJD RISING Text and figures of the latest annual report of the NCJDRSU covering the period 1990-2009 (published 11th March 2011)

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2011/04/sporadic-cjd-rising-text-and-figures-of.html


Tuesday, March 29, 2011

TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY EXPOSURE SPREADING VIA HOSPITALS AND SURGICAL PROCEDURES AROUND THE GLOBE

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html


FC5.1.1

Transmission Results in Squirrel Monkeys Inoculated with Human sCJD, vCJD, and GSS Blood Specimens: the Baxter Study

Brown, P1; Gibson, S2; Williams, L3; Ironside, J4; Will, R4; Kreil, T5; Abee, C3 1Fondation Alliance BioSecure, France; 2University of South Alabama, USA; 3University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center, USA; 4Western General Hospital, UK; 5Baxter BioSience, Austria

Background: Rodent and sheep models of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) have documented blood infectivity in both the pre-clinical and clinical phases of disease. Results in a (presumably more appropriate) non-human primate model have not been reported.

Objective: To determine if blood components (red cells, white cells, platelets, and plasma) from various forms of human TSE are infectious.

Methods: Blood components were inoculated intra-cerebrally (0.1 ml) and intravenously (0.5 ml) into squirrel monkeys from 2 patients with sporadic Creutzfeldt- Jakob disease (sCJD) and 3 patients with variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD). Additional monkeys were inoculated with buffy coat or plasma samples from chimpanzees infected with either sCJD or Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker disease (GSS). Animals were monitored for a period of 5 years, and all dying or sacrificed animals had post-mortem neuropathological examinations and Western blots to determine the presence or absence of the misfolded prion protein (PrPTSE).

Results: No transmissions occurred in any of the animals inoculated with blood components from patients with sporadic or variant CJD. All donor chimpanzees (sCJD and GSS) became symptomatic within 6 weeks of their pre-clinical phase plasmapheresis, several months earlier than the expected onset of illness. One monkey inoculated with purified leukocytes from a pre-clinical GSS chimpanzee developed disease after 36 months.

Conclusion: No infectivity was found in small volumes of blood components from 4 patients with sporadic CJD and 3 patients with variant CJD. ***However, a single transmission from a chimpanzee-passaged strain of GSS shows that infectivity may be present in leukocytes, and the shock of general anaesthesia and plasmspheresis appears to have triggered the onset of illness in pre-clinical donor chimpanzees.



Saturday, September 5, 2009

TSEAC MEETING FEBRUARY 12, 2004 THE BAXTER STUDY GSS

snip...

But the first thing is our own study, and as I mentioned, it's a Baxter primate study, and those are the major participants. And the goal was twofold, and here is the first one: to see whether CJD, either sporadic or familial -- actually it turns out to be the familial CJD is incorrect. It really should be the Fukuoka strain of Gerstmann-Straussler-Scheinker disease. So it's really GSS instead of familial CJD -- when passaged through chimps into squirrel monkeys using purified blood components, very pure blood components.

So this addresses the question that was raised just recently about whether or not red cell infectivity that's been found in rodents is really in the red cells or is it contaminated.

We prepared these samples with exquisite care, and they are ultra-ultra-ultra purified. There's virtually no contamination of any of the components that we looked at ? platelets, red cells, plasma, white cells -- with any other component.

These are a sort of new set of slides, and what I've tried to do is make them less complicated and more clear, but I'm afraid I haven't included the build. So you'll just have to try and follow what I explain with this little red pointer.

There were three initial patients. Two of them had sporadic CJD. One of them had Gerstmann-Straussler-Scheinker syndrome. Brain tissue from each individual patient was inoculated intracerebrally into a pair of chimpanzees. All right?

From those chimps, either plasma or ultra purified -- in fact, everything is ultra-purified. I'll just talk about purified plasma, purified white cells -- were inoculated intracerebrally and intravenously to get the maximum amount of infective load into a pair of squirrel monkeys.

The same thing was done for each of these three sets. This monkey died from non-CJD causes at 34 months post inoculation.

Let me go back for a second. I didn't point out the fact that these were not sacrificed at this point. These chimpanzees were apheresed at 27 weeks when they were still asymptomatic. In this instance, we apheresed them terminally when they were symptomatic.

And before I forget, I want to mention just a little sidelight of this. Chimpanzees in our experience -- and I think we may be the only people that have ever inoculated chimpanzees, and that's no longer a possibility, so this was 20, 30 years ago -- the shortest incubation period of any chimpanzee that we have ever seen with direct intracerebral inoculation is 13 months.

So we chose 27 weeks, which is about seven months, and incidentally typically the incubation period is more like 16 or 18 months. The shortest was 13 months. We chose the 27th week, which is about six and a half months, thinking that this would be about halfway through the incubation period, which we wanted to check for the presence or absence of infectivity.

But within four weeks after the apheresis, which was conducted under general anesthesia for three or four hours apiece, every single one of the six chimpanzees became symptomatic. That is another experiment that I would love to conclude, perhaps because this is simply not heard of, and it very much smells like we triggered clinical illness. We didn't trigger the disease, but it certainly looks like we triggered symptomatic disease at a point that was much earlier than one would have possibly expected.

Maybe it will never be done because it would probably open the floodgates of litigation. There's no end of little things that you can find out from CJD patients after the fact. For example, the neighbor's dog comes over, barks at a patient, makes him fall down, and three weeks later he gets CJD. So you have a lawsuit against the neighbor.

I mean, this is not an unheard of matter, but I do think that physical stress in the form of anesthesia and four hours of whatever goes on with anesthesia, low blood pressure, sometimes a little hypoxemia looks like it's a bad thing.

So here we have the 31st week. All of the chimps are symptomatic, and here what we did was in order to make the most use of the fewest monkeys, which is always a problem in primate research, we took these same three patients and these six chimps. Only now we pooled these components; that is to say, we pooled the plasma from all six chimps. We pooled ultra-purified white cells from all six chimps because here we wanted to see whether or not we could distinguish a difference between intracerebral route of infection and intravenous route of infection.

With respect to platelets and red blood cells, we did not follow that. We inoculated both intracerebral and intravenously, as we had done earlier because nobody has any information on whether or not platelets and red cells are infectious, and so we wanted again to get the maximum.

This is an IV versus IC goal. This one, again, is just getting the maximum load in to see whether there is, in fact, any infectivity in pure platelets, in pure red cells.

And of all of the above, the only transmission of disease related to the inoculation was in a squirrel monkey that received pure leukocytes from the presymptomatic apheresis. So that goes some way to address the question as to whether or not it's a matter of contamination. To date the red cells have not been -- the monkeys that receive red cells have not been observed for more than a year because that was a later experiment.

So we still can't say about red cells, but we're about four and a half years down the road now, and we have a single transmission from purified leukocytes, nothing from plasma and nothing from platelets.

That was the first part of the experiment. The second part was undertaken with the cooperation of Bob Will and others supplying material to us. These were a couple of human, sporadic cases of CJD and three variant cases of CJD from which we obtained buffy coat and plasma separated in a normal way. That is, these are not purified components.

The two cases of sporadic CJD, the plasma was pooled from both patients. The buffy coat was pooled from both patients, and then inoculated intracerebrally and intravenously into three squirrel monkeys each. This is a non-CJD death five years after inoculation. The other animals are still alive.

For variant CJD we decided not to pool. It was more important to eliminate the possibility that there was just a little bit of infectivity in one patient that would have been diluted to extinction, if you like, by mixing them if it were to so occur with two patients, for example, who did not have infectivity. So each one of these was done individually, but the principle was the same: plasma and buffy coat for each patient was inoculated into either two or three squirrel monkeys. This is, again, a non-CJD related death.

In addition to that, we inoculated rain as a positive control from the two sporadic disease cases of human -- from the two human sporadic cases at ten to the minus one and ten to the minus three dilutions. We have done this many, many times in the past with other sporadic patients. So we knew what to expect, and we got exactly what we did expect, namely, after an incubation period not quite two years, all four monkeys developed disease at this dilution and at the minus three dilution, not a whole lot of difference between the two.

Now, these are the crucial monkeys because each one of these monkeys every three to four months was bled and the blood transfused into a new healthy monkey, but the same monkey all the time. So this monkey, for example, would have received in the course of 21 months about six different transfusions of blood from this monkey into this monkey, similarly with this pair, this pair, and this pair. So you can call these buddies. This is sort of the term that was used. These monkeys are still alive.

In the same way, the three human variant CJD specimens, brain, were inoculated into four monkeys, and again, each one of these monkeys has been repeatedly bled at three to four month intervals and that blood transfused into a squirrel monkey, the same one each time. Ideally we would love to have taken bleeding at three months and inoculated a monkey and then let him go, watch him, and then done the same thing at six months. It would have increased the number of monkeys eightfold and just unacceptably expensive. So we did the best we could.

That, again, is a non-CJD death, as is this.

This was of interest mainly to show that the titer of infectivity in brain from variant CJD is just about the same as it from sporadic. We didn't do a minus five and a minus seven in sporadic because we have an enormous experience already with sporadic disease in squirrel monkeys, and we know that this is exactly what happens. It disappears at about ten to the minus five. So the brain titer in monkeys receiving human vCJD is identical to the brain titer in monkeys that have been inoculated with sporadic CJD.

That's the experiment. All of the monkeys in aqua are still alive. They are approaching a five-year observation period, and I think the termination of this experiment will now need to be discussed very seriously in view of a probable six-year incubation period in the U.K. case. The original plan was to terminate the experiment after five years of observation with the understanding that ideally you would keep these animals for their entire life span, which is what we used to do when had unlimited space, money, and facilities. We can't do that anymore.

It's not cheap, but I think in view of the U.K. case, it will be very important to think very seriously about allowing at least these buddies and the buddies from the sporadic CJD to go on for several more years because although you might think that the U.K. case has made experimental work redundant, in point of fact, anything that bears on the risk of this disease in humans is worthwhile knowing, and one of the things we don't know is frequency of infection. We don't know whether this case in the U.K. is going to be unique and never happen again or whether all 13 or 14 patients have received blood components are ultimately going to die. Let's hope not.

The French primate study is primarily directed now by Corinne Lasmezas. As you know, the late Dominique Dromont was the original, originally initiated this work, and they have very active primate laboratory in France, and I'm only going to show two very simple slides to summarize what they did.

The first one is simply to show you the basis of their statement that the IV route of infection looks to be pretty efficient because we all know that the intracerebral route of infection is the most efficient, and if you look at this where they inoculated the same infective load either intracerebrally or intravenously, the incubation periods were not substantially different, which suggests but doesn't prove, but doesn't prove that the route of infection is pretty efficient.

Lower doses of brain material given IV did extend the incubation period and presumably it's because of the usual dose response phenomenon that you see in any infectious disease.

With a whopping dose of brain orally, the incubation period was even lower. Again, just one more example of inefficiency of the route of infection and the necessity to use more infective material to get transmissions.

And they also have blood inoculated IV which is on test, and the final slide or at least the penultimate slide shows you what they have on test and the time of observation, that taken human vCJD and like us inoculated buffy coat, they've also inoculated whole blood which we did not do.

So to a great extent their studies are complementary to ours and makes it all worthwhile.

We have about -- oh, I don't know -- a one to two-year lead time on the French, but they're still getting into pretty good observation periods. Here's three-plus years.

They have variant CJD adapted to the macaque. That is to say this one was passaged in macaque monkeys, the cynomolgus, and they did the same thing. Again, we're talking about a study here in which like ours there are no transmissions. I mean, we have that one transmission from leukocytes, and that's it.

Here is a BSE adapted to the macaque. Whole blood, and then they chose to inoculate leukodepleted whole blood, in both instances IV. Here they are out to five years without a transmission.

And then finally oral dosing of the macaque, which had been infected with -- which was infected with BSE, but a macaque passaged BSE, whole blood buffy coat and plasma, all by the IC route, and they're out to three years.

So with the single exception of the leukocyte transmission from our chimp that was inoculated with a sporadic case of CJD or -- excuse me -- with a GSS, Gerstmann-Straussler, in neither our study nor the French study, which are not yet completed have we yet seen a transmission.

And I will just close with a little cartoon that appeared in the Washington Post that I modified slightly lest you get too wound up with these questions of the risk from blood. This should be a "corrective."

(Laughter.)

DR. BROWN: Thanks.

Questions?

CHAIRPERSON PRIOLA: Yes. Any questions for Dr. Brown? Dr. Linden.

DR. LINDEN: I just want to make sure I understand your study design correctly. When you mention the monkeys that have the IV and IC inoculations, the individual monkeys had both or --

DR. BROWN: Yes, yes, yes. That's exactly right.

DR. LINDEN: So an individual monkey had both of those as opposed to some monkeys had one and some had the other?

DR. BROWN: Correct, correct. Where IC and IV are put down together was IC plus IV into a given monkey.

DR. LINDEN: Into a given monkey. Okay.

And the IC inoculations, where were those given?

DR. BROWN: Right parietal cortex, Southern Alabama.

(Laughter.)

DR. BROWN: Oh, it can't be that clear. Yeah, here, Pierluigi.

CHAIRPERSON PRIOLA: Dr. Epstein.

DR. BROWN: Pierluigi always damns me with feint praise. He always says that's a very interesting study, but. I'm waiting for that, Pierluigi.

I think Jay Epstein --

DR. GAMBETTI: I will say that there's an interesting study and will say, but I just --

(Laughter.)

DR. GAMBETTI: -- I just point of review. You talk about a point of information. You say that -- you mention GSS, I guess, and the what, Fukuowa (phonetic) --

DR. BROWN: Yes, Fukuoka 1.

DR. GAMBETTI: Fukuowa, and is that from the 102, if I remember correctly, of the --

DR. BROWN: Yes, that is correct.

DR. GAMBETTI: Because that is the only one that also --

DR. BROWN: No, it's not 102. It's 101. It's the standard. It's a classical GSS. Oh, excuse me. You're right. One, oh, two is classical GSS. It's been so long since I've done genetics. You're right.

DR. GAMBETTI: Because that is the only one I know, I think, that I can remember that has both the seven kv fragment that is characteristic of GSS, but also the PrPsc 2730. So in a sense, it can be stretching a little bit compared to the sporadic CJD.

DR. BROWN: Yeah, I think that's right. That's why I want to be sure that I made you aware on the very first slide that that was not accurate, that it truly was GSS.

There's a GSS strain that has been adapted to mice, and it's a hot strain, and therefore, it may not be translatable to sporadic disease, correct. All we can say for sure is that it is a human TSE, and it is not variant. I think that's about it.

DR. GAMBETTI: I agree, but this is also not perhaps the best --

DR. BROWN: No, it is not the best. We understand --

DR. GAMBETTI: -- of GSS either.

DR. BROWN: Yeah. If we had to do it over again, we'd look around for a -- well, I don't know. We'd probably do it the same way because we have two sporadics already on test they haven't transmitted, and so you can take your pick of what you want to pay attention to.

Jay?

DR. EPSTEIN: Yes, Paul. Could you just comment? If I understood you correctly, when you did the pooled apheresis plasma from the six chimps when they were symptomatic at 31 weeks, you also put leukocytes into squirrel monkeys in that case separately IV and IC, but in that instance you have not seen an infection come down in squirrel monkey, and the question is whether it's puzzling that you got transmission from the 27-week asymptomatic sampling, whereas you did not see transmission from the 31-week sampling in symptomatic animals.

DR. BROWN: Yes, I think there are two or three possible explanations, and I don't know if any of them are important. The pre-symptomatic animal was almost symptomatic as it turned out so that we were pretty close to the period at which symptoms would being, and whether you can, you know, make much money on saying one was incubation period and the other was symptomatic in this particular case because both bleedings were so close together. That's one possibility.

The other possibility is we're dealing with a very irregular phenomenon and you're not surprised at all by surprises, so to speak so that a single animal, you could see it almost anywhere.

The third is that we, in fact, did just what I suggested we didn't want to do for the preclinical, namely, by pooling we got under the threshold. See?

You can again take that for what it's worth. It is a possible explanation, and again, until we know what the levels of infectivity are and whether by pooling we get under the threshold of transmission, we simply cannot make pronouncements.

CHAIRPERSON PRIOLA: Dr. DeArmond.

DR. DeARMOND: Yeah, it was very interesting data, but the --

(Laughter.)

DR. BROWN: I just love it. Go ahead.

DR. DeARMOND: Two comments. The first one was that the GSS cases, as I remember from reading your publications -- I think Gibbs was involved with them -- when you transmitted the GSS into animals, into monkeys, perhaps I think it was chimps, the transmission was more typical of CJD rather than GSS. There were no amyloid plaques. It was vacuolar degeneration so that you may be transmitting a peculiar form, as I criticized once in Bali and then you jumped all over me about.

DR. BROWN: I may do it again.

DR. DeARMOND: Calling me a bigot and some other few things like that.

(Laughter.)

DR. BROWN: Surely not. I wouldn't have said that.

DR. DeARMOND: So there could be something strange about that particular --

DR. BROWN: Yeah. I think you and Pierluigi are on the same page here. This may be an unusual strain from a number of points of view.

DR. DeARMOND: The other question though has to do with species barrier because the data you're showing is kind of very reassuring to us that it's hard to transmit from blood, but the data from the sheep and from the hamsters and some of the work, I think, that has been done by others, that it's easy in some other animals to transmit, hamster to hamster, mouse to mouse.

Could you comment on the --

DR. BROWN: That's exactly why we went to primates. That's exactly it, because a primate is closer to a human than a mouse is, and that's just common sense.

And so to try and get a little closer to the human situation and not totally depend on rodents for transferrable data, that is why you would use a primate. Otherwise you wouldn't use them. They're too expensive and they cause grief to animal care study people and protocol makers and the whole thing.

Primate studies are a real pain.

DR. DeARMOND: But right now it's inconclusive and you need more time on it.

DR. BROWN: I believe that's true. I think if we cut it off at six years you could still say it was inconclusive, and cutting it off at all will be to some degree inconclusive, and that's just the way it is.

DR. DeARMOND: So what has to be done? Who do you have to convince, or who do we all have to convince to keep that going?

DR. BROWN: Thomas?

Without trying to be flip at all, the people that would be the first people to try to convince would be the funders of the original study. If that fails, and it might for purely practical reasons of finance, then we will have to look elsewhere because I really don't want to see those animals sacrificed, not those eight buddies. Those are crucial animals, and they don't cost a whole lot to maintain. You can maintain eight -- well, they cost a lot from my point of view, but 15 to $20,000 a year would keep them going year after year.

CHAIRPERSON PRIOLA: Dr. Johnson.

DR. JOHNSON: Yeah, Paul, I'm intrigued as you are by the shortening of the incubation period. Have you in all of the other years of handling these animals when they were transfused, when they were flown out to Louisiana at night -- a lot of the stressful things have happened to some of these chimps. Have you ever noticed that before or is this a new observation?

DR. BROWN: Brand new.

MR. JOHNSON: Brand new. Okay.

CHAIRPERSON PRIOLA: Bob, did you want to say something? Dr. Rohwer.

DR. ROHWER: The Frederick fire, wasn't that correlated with a lot of --

DR. BROWN: Not that I k now of, but you may --

DR. ROHWER: Well, that occurred shortly after I came to NIH, and what I remember is that there were a whole bunch of conversions that occurred within the few months following the fire. That was fire that occurred adjacent to the NINDS facility, but in order to protect it, they moved the monkeys out onto the tarmac because they weren't sure it wouldn't burn as well.

DR. BROWN: Well, if you're right, then it's not brand new, but I mean, I'm not sure how we'll ever know because if I call Carlton and ask him, I'm not sure but what I would trust the answer that he gives me, short of records.

You know, Carlot is a very enthusiastic person, and he might say, "Oh, yeah, my God, the whole floor died within three days," but I would want to verify that.

On the other hand, it may be verifiable. There possibly are records that are still extant.

DR. ROHWER: Actually I thought I heard the story from you.

(Laughter.)

DR. BROWN: You didn't because it's brand new for me. I mean, either that or I'm on the way

(Laughter.)

CHAIRPERSON PRIOLA: Dr. Bracey.

DR. BRACEY: I was wondering if some of the variability in terms of the intravenous infection route may be related to intraspecies barriers, that is, the genetic differences, the way the cells, the white leukocytes are processed, whether or not microchimerism is established, et cetera.

DR. BROWN: I don't think that processing is at fault, but the question, the point that you raise is a very good one, and needless to say, we have material with which we can analyze genetically all of the animals, and should it turn out that we get, for example, -- I don't know -- a transmission in one variant monkey and no transmissions in another and a transmission in three sporadic monkeys, we will at that point genetically analyze every single animal that has been used in this study, but we wanted to wait until we could see what would be most useful to analyze.

but the material is there, and if need be, we'll do it.

CHAIRPERSON PRIOLA: Okay. Thank you very much, Dr. Brown.

I think we'll move on to the open public hearing section of the morning.

snip...

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/04/transcripts/4019t1.DOC



snip...

see full text ;

http://tseac.blogspot.com/2009/09/tseac-meeting-february-12-2004-baxter.html


Friday, June 03, 2011

Estimation of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease infectivity titers in human blood

http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/2011/06/estimation-of-variant-creutzfeldt-jakob.html


Wednesday, March 2, 2011

Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Meeting Transcript Posted: 3/2/2011 Posted: 3/2/2011

October 28, 2010

http://tseac.blogspot.com/2011/03/transmissible-spongiform.html


Tuesday, September 14, 2010

Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee; Notice of Meeting October 28 and 29, 2010 (COMMENT SUBMISSION)

http://tseac.blogspot.com/2010/09/transmissible-spongiform_14.html


Sunday, May 10, 2009

Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Committee On June 12, 2009 (Singeltary submission)

TO : william.freas@fda.hhs.gov

May 8, 2009

Greetings again Dr. Freas, TSEAC et al,

I would kindly, once again, wish to comment at this meeting about the urgent actions that need to be taken asap, to the Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Committee On June 12, 2009. Due to my disability from my neck injury, I will not be attending this meeting either, however I hope for my submission to be read and submitted. ...

IN reply to ;

http://tseac.blogspot.com/2009/05/meeting-of-transmissible-spongiform.html


Friday, June 12, 2009

vCJD-related abnormal prion protein in a person with haemophilia - an update

http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/2009/06/vcjd-related-abnormal-prion-protein-in.html


Asante/Collinge et al, that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest _sporadic_ CJD;

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/slides/3923s1_OPH.htm


PDF]Freas, William TSS SUBMISSION

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat -

Page 1. J Freas, William From: Sent: To: Subject: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder@wt.net]

Monday, January 08,200l 3:03 PM freas ...

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/slides/3681s2_09.pdf


-----Original Message-----

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [mailto:flounder@wt.net]

Sent: Tuesday, February 18, 2003 12:45 PM

To: Freas, William

Cc: Langford, Sheila

Subject: Re: re-vCJD/blood and meeting of Feb. 20, 2003

Greetings FDA,

Asante/Collinge et al, that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest _sporadic_ CJD;

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/slides/3923s1_OPH.htm


Tuesday, February 8, 2011

U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001

http://tseac.blogspot.com/2011/02/usa-50-state-bse-mad-cow-conference.html


Suppressed peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002.

October 31, 2002 Review of the Evaluation of the Potential for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in the United States Conducted by the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, Harvard School of Public Health and Center for Computational Epidemiology, College of Veterinary Medicine, Tuskegee University Final Report Prepared for U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service Office of Public Health and Science Prepared by RTI Health, Social, and Economics Research Research Triangle Park, NC 27709 RTI Project Number 07182.024

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/topics/BSE_Peer_Review.pdf


Sunday, February 14, 2010

[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)

http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/02/docket-no-fsis-2006-0011-fsis-harvard.html


PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT 98 PAGES HERE ;

[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf


Response to Public Comments on the Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

Update, October 31, 2005 INTRODUCTION The United States Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) held a public meeting on July 25, 2006 in Washington, D.C. to present findings from the Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October 31, 2005 (report and model located on the FSIS website: http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Science/Risk_Assessments/index.asp).

Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted to FSIS. Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S. Singeltary.

This document provides itemized replies to the public comments received on the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the following points in mind:

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf


From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

To: FREAS@CBER.FDA.GOV

Cc: william.freas@fda.hhs.gov ; rosanna.harvey@fda.hhs.gov

Sent: Friday, December 01, 2006 2:59 PM

Subject: Re: TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006 [TSS SUBMISSION]

snip...

ONE FINAL COMMENT PLEASE, (i know this is long Dr. Freas but please bear with me)

THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted blood from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone.

These are the facts as i have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species. ...

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

snip... 48 pages...page 1 starts on page 13, then come back to page 1 to finish.....tss

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f3413&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8


TSEAC JUNE 2, 1999

Welcome to the FDA traveling road show

From: TSS

snip...

CHAIRMAN BROWN: A couple of points just to bring your experimental data up to speed. Unpublished further experiments on the mouse model have produced good news and bad news.

The bad news is that we have a disappointingly large number of transmissions following intravenous inoculation of either plasma or Buffy coat. We also have a transmission using whole blood as a transfusion into these mice. So that's not good news.

The other thing that is not too good is that we have now got in this particular model a ratio of five to one, as opposed to ten to one, which was also disappointing.

The only piece of good news in that in terms of experimental data is that we found that, again, in this model, the level of infectivity during the entire incubation period is almost negligible compared to the level of infectivity during the clinical phase of illness. And that is very good news indeed. So these are data that are not yet published but ??

snip...

snip...page 154

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, this is exactly why we're here today. Dr. Satcher and the other groups have already decided that this is not worth significant worry with respect to classical CJD, and that new variant was an unknown. And so that's why we're considering specifically new variant because we don't have information specifically on it. I mean, everything we don't have information on becomes a subject for this committee. (Laughter.)

snip...

snip...page 218

MS. HARRELL: Well, I asked him the question, was there a deferral ?? was there deferral criteria for blood donors for classic CJD for people who have either resided or visited the UK.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: I'm sorry. Repeat that, the question.

MS. HARRELL: Is there a deferral policy for blood donors to attempt to reduce the risk of transmitting classic CJD for people who either resided or visited the UK?

DR. SCHONBERGER: The answer is no.

MS. HARRELL: And if there is no risk, if we think that there is no risk of transmitting the whatever to ?? for CJD, what makes this different, for new variant CJD much different?

CHAIRMAN BROWN: That's the first time, Stan, you'll ever hear of prion referred to as a whatever. (Laughter.)

CHAIRMAN BROWN: I mean, I've heard it referred to as a lot of different things. I'm ??

DR. PRUSINER: You've said that many times, Paul. (Laughter.)

CHAIRMAN BROWN: It may be that ??

DR. PRUSINER: Is that in the Congressional Record?

CHAIRMAN BROWN: The issue is not about sporadic CJD. That is the issue we can sort of generically say CJD. Presumably, if the blood from a patient with new variant CJD were infectious, the disease that it would transmit would be new variant CJD. So it's not ??

MS. HARRELL: Okay. So CJD is not transmitted through the blood is what you're saying?

CHAIRMAN BROWN: We have no evidence from looking at populations that that has ever happened. The question is: since we know it can happen when we use experimental models of CJD, we can take CJD blood from one animal and produce the disease in another animal.

So there is the "theoretical possibility" that this might also happen in humans, particularly with a different strain of the disease, which new variant is, about which we don't know a whole lot. That's the question.

DR. SCHONBERGER: Isn't the answer to her question that the incidence of CJD, REDS, classic CJD, is not influenced by whether or not you've lived in the UK between 1980 and 1996 ??

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes.

DR. SCHONBERGER: ?? but the incidence of new variant CJD is?

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, 40-love. (Laughter.)


snip...


see more here ;

http://tseac.blogspot.com/2011/06/tseac-june-2-1999-welcome-to-fda.html



Saturday, January 2, 2010

Human Prion Diseases in the United States January 1, 2010 ***FINAL***

http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/01/human-prion-diseases-in-united-states.html


Manuscript Draft Manuscript Number: Title: HUMAN and ANIMAL TSE Classifications i.e. mad cow disease and the UKBSEnvCJD only theory Article Type: Personal View Corresponding Author: Mr. Terry S. Singeltary, Corresponding Author's Institution: na First Author: Terry S Singeltary, none Order of Authors: Terry S Singeltary, none; Terry S. Singeltary Abstract: TSEs have been rampant in the USA for decades in many species, and they all have been rendered and fed back to animals for human/animal consumption. I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2007.

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=090000648027c28e&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf


my comments to PLosone here ;

http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action?inReplyTo=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fannotation%2F04ce2b24-613d-46e6-9802-4131e2bfa6fd&root=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fannotation%2F04ce2b24-613d-46e6-9802-4131e2bfa6fd


Wednesday, March 31, 2010

Atypical BSE in Cattle

To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.

This study will contribute to a correct definition of specified risk material (SRM) in atypical BSE. The incumbent of this position will develop new and transfer existing, ultra-sensitive methods for the detection of atypical BSE in tissue of experimentally infected cattle.

http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2


Thursday, August 12, 2010

Seven main threats for the future linked to prions

First threat

The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed. ***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

Second threat

snip...

http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html


http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/seven-main-threats-for-future-linked-to.html


14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -

Final Abstract Number: ISE.114

Session: International Scientific Exchange

Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America

update October 2009

T. Singeltary

Bacliff, TX, USA

Background:

An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.

Methods:

12 years independent research of available data

Results:

I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.

Conclusion:

I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.

http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/14th_ICID_ISE_Abstracts.pdf



Thursday, February 24, 2011

The risk of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease among UK patients with bleeding disorders, known to have received potentially contaminated plasma products

http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/2011/02/risk-of-variant-creutzfeldt-jakob.html


Saturday, January 22, 2011

Alzheimer's, Prion, and Neurological disease, and the misdiagnosis there of, a review 2011

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/alzheimers-prion-and-neurological.html



CJD1/9 0185

Ref: 1M51A

IN STRICT CONFIDENCE

Dr McGovern From: Dr A Wight

Date: 5 January 1993

Copies: Dr Metters

Dr Skinner

Dr Pickles

Dr Morris

Mr Murray

TRANSMISSION OF ALZHEIMER-TYPE PLAQUES TO PRIMATES

1. CMO will wish to be aware that a meeting was held at DH yesterday, 4 January, to discuss the above findings. It was chaired by Professor Murray (Chairman of the MRC Co-ordinating Committee on Research in the Spongiform Encephalopathies in Man), and attended by relevant experts in the fields of Neurology, Neuropathology, molecular biology, amyloid biochemistry, and the spongiform encephalopathies, and by representatives of the MRC and AFRC.

2. Briefly, the meeting agreed that:

i) Dr Ridley et als findings of experimental induction of p amyloid in primates were valid, interesting and a significant advance in the understanding of neurodegenerative disorders;

ii) there were no immediate implications for the public health, and no further safeguards were thought to be necessary at present; and

iii) additional research was desirable, both epidemiological and at the molecular level. Possible avenues are being followed up by DH and the MRC, but the details will require further discussion.

93/01.05/4.1tss

http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102191246/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1993/01/05004001.pdf



BSE101/1 0136

IN CONFIDENCE

5 NOV 1992

CMO From: Dr J S Metters DCMO 4 November 1992

TRANSMISSION OF ALZHEIMER TYPE PLAQUES TO PRIMATES

1. Thank you for showing me Diana Dunstan's letter. I am glad that MRC have recognized the public sensitivity of these findings and intend to report them in their proper context. This hopefully will avoid misunderstanding and possible distortion by the media to portray the results as having more greater significance than the findings so far justify.

2. Using a highly unusual route of transmission (intra-cerebral injection) the researchers have demonstrated the transmission of a pathological process from two cases one of severe Alzheimer's disease the other of Gerstmann-Straussler disease to marmosets. However they have not demonstrated the transmission of either clinical condition as the "animals were behaving normally when killed'. As the report emphasizes the unanswered question is whether the disease condition would have revealed itself if the marmosets had lived longer. They are planning further research to see if the conditions, as opposed to the partial pathological process, is transmissible.

What are the implications for public health?

3. . The route of transmission is very specific and in the natural state of things highly unusual. However it could be argued that the results reveal a potential risk, in that brain tissue from these two patients has been shown to transmit a pathological process. Should therefore brain tissue from such cases be regarded as potentially infective? Pathologists, morticians, neuro surgeons and those assisting at neuro surgical procedures and others coming into contact with "raw" human brain tissue could in theory be at risk. However, on a priori grounds given the highly specific route of transmission in these experiments that risk must be negligible if the usual precautions for handling brain tissue are observed.

92/11.4/1-1

BSE101/1 0137

4. The other dimension to consider is the public reaction. To some extent the GSS case demonstrates little more than the transmission of BSE to a pig by intra-cerebral injection. If other prion diseases can be transmitted in this way it is little surprise that some pathological findings observed in GSS were also transmissible to a marmoset. But the transmission of features of Alzheimer's pathology is a different matter, given the much greater frequency of this disease and raises the unanswered question whether some cases are the result of a transmissible prion. The only tenable public line will be that "more research is required" before that hypothesis could be evaluated. The possibility on a transmissible prion remains open. In the meantime MRC needs carefully to consider the range and sequence of studies needed to follow through from the preliminary observations in these two cases. Not a particularly comfortable message, but until we know more about the causation of Alzheimer's disease the total reassurance is not practical.

JS METTERS Room 509 Richmond House Pager No: 081-884 3344 Callsign: DOH 832

121/YdeStss

92/11.4/1.2

http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102232842/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1992/11/04001001.pdf



http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/


Oral presentations

Oral.01: Changing Spectrum of Prions

Stanley Prusiner

University of California San Francisco, Institute for Neurodegenerative Diseases; San Francisco, CA USA

Prions are self-propagating forms of proteins found in eukaryotes. Prions are created from benign, cellular precursor proteins by a posttranslational modification that is self-perpetuating. Often the prion form of the protein is aggregated and assembles into amyloid polymers. Prions can be inherited both genetically and epigenetically. In neurodegenerative diseases, the formation of prions is heritable through mutations in the gene encoding the cellular form of the prion protein. In fungi, the prion state is epigenetically transferred from mother to daughter cells.

Historically, prions were confined to a small group of infectious CNS illnesses including Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) and kuru of humans, scrapie of sheep, bovine spongiform encephalopathy, and chronic wasting disease of deer and elk. CJD can present as an infectious, inherited or sporadic illness. In all three manifestations of the disease, the cellular prion protein (PrPC) refolds into the disease-causing isoform (PrPSc). A truncated form of PrPSc readily polymerizes into amyloid fibrils and forms PrP amyloid plaques. Prion strains composed of different conformers of PrPScSc have been identified. Subsequently, prions were recognized in fungi and studied extensively using yeast. Recently, self-propagation of altered proteins that cause several neurodegenerative diseases, including Alzheimer disease and the tauopathies, has been demonstrated using cultured cell and transgenic mouse models. Increasing evidence argues that the Ab peptide acts as a prion in that it stimulates the de-novo formation of more Ab peptide. Similarly, the aggregates of Tau provoke the assembly of more aggregated Tau. In addition, fetal grafts of substantia nigra in patients with advanced Parkinson’s disease exhibit Lewy bodies, arguing that a-synuclein may act as a prion. Misfolded a-synuclein is thought to transit from the patient’s neurons to those in the graft, where it stimulates the de-novo formation of aberrantly folded a-synuclein into Lewy bodies.

The spread of misprocessed proteins in the human CNS is also consistent with the Ab peptide, hyperphosphorylated Tau and misfolded a-synuclein being prions. In Alzheimer disease, Ab plaques and neurofibrillary tangles (NFTs) begin in the entorhinal cortex and spread throughout the brain. In a delayed form of traumatic brain injury, NFTs appear to spread outward from points of impact. Misfolded a-synuclein has been found along the vagus nerve where it appears to migrate retrograde into the CNS.

Increasing evidence that posttranslationally altered proteins are responsible for the major neurodegenerative diseases widens the spectrum of prion disorders. Moreover, prions with glutamine/asparagine-rich regions like those in yeast and aplysia have given unique insights into the normal function of alternatively processed, self-propagating proteins.

http://www.prion2011.ca/files/PRION_2011_-_Posters_(May_5-11).pdf


Wednesday, January 5, 2011

ENLARGING SPECTRUM OF PRION-LIKE DISEASES Prusiner Colby et al 2011 Prions

David W. Colby1,* and Stanley B. Prusiner1,2

http://cshperspectives.cshlp.org/content/3/1/a006833.full.pdf+html


http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/2011/01/enlarging-spectrum-of-prion-like.html


Friday, September 3, 2010

Alzheimer's, Autism, Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, Parkinson's, Prionoids, Prionpathy, Prionopathy, TSE

http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/2010/09/alzheimers-autism-amyotrophic-lateral.html


Thursday, December 23, 2010

Alimentary prion infections: Touch-down in the intestine, Alzheimer, Parkinson disease and TSE mad cow diseases $ The Center for Consumer Freedom

http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/2010/12/alimentary-prion-infections-touch-down.html


Saturday, March 22, 2008

10 Million Baby Boomers to have Alzheimer's in the coming decades

snip...

Alzheimer’s disease is the seventh leading cause of all deaths in the United States and the fifth leading cause of death in Americans older than the age of 65 years. More than 5 million Americans are estimated to have Alzheimer’s disease. Every 71 seconds someone in America develops Alzheimer’s disease; by 2050 it is expected to occur every 33 seconds. During the coming decades, baby boomers are projected to add 10 million people to these numbers. By 2050, the incidence of Alzheimer’s disease is expected to approach nearly a million people per year, with a total estimated prevalence of 11 to 16 million persons. Significant cost implications related to Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias include an estimated $148 billion annually in direct (Medicare/Medicaid) and indirect (eg, caregiver lost wages and out-of-pocket expenses, decreased business productivity) costs. Not included in these figures are the estimated 10 million caregivers who annually provide $89 billion in unpaid services to individuals with Alzheimer’s disease.

snip...

http://www.alzheimersanddementia.org/webfiles/images/journals/jalz/JALZ_739.pdf



see full text and more ;

http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/2008/03/10-million-baby-boomers-to-have.html


http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/


TSS



UPDATE JULY 27, 2011


August 1, 2011 Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Meeting Draft Agenda (PDF - 18KB)




Posted: 7/27/2011



http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/BloodVaccinesandOtherBiologics/TransmissibleSpongiformEncephalopathiesAdvisoryCommittee/UCM265683.pdf


August 1, 2011 Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Meeting: Issue Summary (PDF - 154KB)
Posted: 7/27/2011


http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/BloodVaccinesandOtherBiologics/TransmissibleSpongiformEncephalopathiesAdvisoryCommittee/UCM265682.pdf



----- Original Message -----



From: Emery, Bryan (CBER)



To: 'Terry S. Singeltary Sr.'



Cc: Emery, Bryan (CBER)



Sent: Friday, July 22, 2011 9:47 AM



Subject: RE: TSEAC Meeting August 1, 2011 donor deferral Saudi Arabia vCJD risk blood and blood products



Hi Mr. Singeltary,



Your statement will be provided to the members and will be placed in the meetings display folder for the public to see. Come or attend via webcast.



thanks for your public participation



LCDR Bryan Emery



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [mailto:flounder9@verizon.net]



Sent: Wednesday, June 29, 2011 3:54 PM



To: Emery, Bryan (CBER)



Cc: Harvey, Rosanna; BSE-L@LISTS.AEGEE.ORG; CJD-L@LISTS.AEGEE.ORG; cjdvoice@yahoogroups.com; BLOODCJD@YAHOOGROUPS.COM; Advocatejr@aol.com; COTTWEST@SILCOM.COM; Dave Cavenaugh



Subject: TSEAC Meeting August 1, 2011 donor deferral Saudi Arabia vCJD risk blood and blood products



Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee



Center Date Time Location



CBER August 1, 2011 9:00 a.m. - 4:30 p.m.



Hilton Washington DC/North, 620 Perry Pkwy., Gaithersburg, MD



Agenda



snip...end...TSS



Wednesday, June 29, 2011



TSEAC Meeting August 1, 2011 donor deferral Saudi Arabia vCJD risk blood and blood products



http://tseac.blogspot.com/2011/06/tseac-meeting-august-1-2011-donor.html




Bio.108: Transmission of Prion Disease by Multiple, Clinically-Relevant Blood Components Following a Single Blood Transfusion



Sandra McCutcheon,2,† Anthony R. Alejo Blanco,2 E. Fiona Houston,1 Christopher de Wolf,2 Boon Chin Tan,2 Nora Hunter,2 Valerie Hornsey,3 Ian R. MacGregor,3 Christopher V. Prowse,3 Marc Turner3, 4 and Jean C. Manson2



1The University of Glasgow; Glasgow, UK; 2The Roslin Institute and R(D)SVS, University of Edinburgh; Edinburgh, UK; 3Scottish National Blood Transfusion Service; Edinburgh, UK; 4The University of Edinburgh; Edinburgh, UK;†Presenting author; Email: sandra.mccutcheon@roslin.ed.ac.uk



Variant CJD (vCJD) is an incurable, infectious human disease, likely arising from the consumption of BSE-contaminated meat products. While the epidemic appears to be waning, there is much concern that vCJD infection may be amplified/prolonged in humans by the transfusion of contaminated blood products. Since 2004, several cases of transfusion-associated vCJD transmission have been reported. Using the most appropriate animal model available, in which the disease manifested resembles that of humans affected with vCJD, we examined which blood components used in human medicine are likely to pose the greatest risk of transmitting vCJD via transfusion. We collected two full units of blood from BSE-infected donor animals during the pre-clinical phase of infection. Using methods employed by transfusion services we prepared red cell concentrates, plasma and platelets units (including leucoreduced equivalents). Following transfusion to recipients, we showed that all components contain sufficient levels of infectivity to cause disease following only a single transfusion and also that leucoreduction did not prevent disease transmission. These data suggest that all blood components can act as potential vectors for prion transmission and highlight the importance of multiple control measures to minimize the risk of human to human transmission of vCJD by blood transfusion.



PPPM.18: Induction of Ab Amyloidogenesis In Vivo by Blood Transfusion



Rodrigo Morales,1,† Claudia Duran-Aniotz,1, 2 Akihiko Urayama,1 Lisbell Estrada,3 Diego Morales-Scheihing1, 2 and Claudio Soto1



1University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston; Houston, TX USA; 2Universidad de Los Andes; Santiago, Chile; 3Universidad Catolica de Chile; Santiago, Chile†Presenting author; Email: Rodrigo.MoralesLoyola@uth.tmc.edu



Alzheimer disease (AD) is the most common type of senile dementia. Disease manifestation is characterized by progressive impairment of memory and cognition which is triggered by synaptic dysfunction and neuronal loss. Compelling evidence suggests that misfolding and aggregation of Ab is a hallmark event in the disease pathogenesis. An important unanswered question related to AD involves its etiology since over 90% of the AD cases arise sporadically. Interestingly, misfolding and aggregation of proteins is the main feature of other diseases -termed Protein Misfolding Disorders (PMDs)] which include Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSEs), among others. Convincing experimental evidences have shown that the only component of the infectious agent in TSEs is the misfolded form of the prion protein. Strikingly, the molecular mechanisms responsible for prion replication are very similar to the process of amyloid formation in all PMDs, suggesting that all these diseases have the inherent capability of being transmissible. Recent reports have shown that intra-cerebral and intra-peritoneal administration of brain homogenates containing Ab aggregates can accelerate the generation of senile plaques in mice models of AD. However, it remains to be demonstrated if this phenomenon can occur by more relevant routes of administration. The aim of this study was to assess whether AD pathogenesis can be induced intravenously, mimicking the know transmission of prion diseases through blood transfusion. For this purpose we used young tg2576 mice which were injected with blood obtained from 12 months old tg2576 mice (AD-blood) that contains a substantial quantity of cerebral Ab deposits. Mice were sacrificed at 250 days old, a time in which these animals scarcely develop Ab deposits. Interestingly, we observed that infusion of AD-blood induces substantial Ab accumulation in animals that without treatment or injected with wild type blood would barely have any detectable Ab lesion. Plaque deposition was mainly present in cortex and hippocampus, being more abundant in the former. In addition, we observed a decrease in memory in mice challenged with AD-blood. Other features such as brain inflammation and synaptic integrity were also measured. Importantly, similar results were obtained in a second and independent experiment performed in a double transgenic mouse model that develops AD plaques as early as 4 months old. Our results indicate that an AD-like pathogenesis can be induced by intravenous administration of AD-blood, presumably through induction of protein misfolding in a similar way as prion diseases. These findings may open a new avenue to understand the origin of sporadic AD and may provide new strategies for disease intervention and prevention.



http://www.prion2011.ca/files/PRION_2011_-_Posters_(May_5-11).pdf





Tuesday, July 26, 2011



Irhad Rizvo Durakovic has lost his fight to nvCJD R.I.P.



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2011/07/irhad-rizvo-durakovic-has-lost-his.html



http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/



http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/




Wednesday, July 27, 2011



HIQA says vCJD blood filter not justified



[Posted: Wed 27/07/2011 http://www.irishhealth.com/]





http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/2011/07/hiqa-says-vcjd-blood-filter-not.html




----- Original Message -----



From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."



To:



Sent: Wednesday, June 29, 2011 2:54 PM



Subject: [CJD-L] TSEAC Meeting August 1, 2011 donor deferral Saudi Arabia vCJD risk blood and blood products



Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee



Center Date Time Location



CBER August 1, 2011 9:00 a.m. - 4:30 p.m.



Hilton Washington DC/North, 620 Perry Pkwy., Gaithersburg, MD



Agenda



On August 1, 2011, in the morning, the committee will discuss donor deferral for time spent in Saudi Arabia to reduce the risk of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) by blood and blood products and human cells, tissues and cellular and tissue-based products.



SNIP...



Wednesday, June 29, 2011



TSEAC Meeting August 1, 2011 donor deferral Saudi Arabia vCJD risk blood and blood products



http://tseac.blogspot.com/2011/06/tseac-meeting-august-1-2011-donor.html





TSS